2b. FrakesWasserman_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

1/18/2013 11:57 AM

Does Agency Funding Affect
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical
Assessment of the PTO’s Granting
Patterns
Michael D. Frakes
Melissa F. Wasserman**
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 68
I.
THE PTO’ S FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND ITS
OBJECTIVES ........................................................................ 75
A.
The PTO’s Budget Process and Its Possible
Financial Incentives to Grant Patents ...................... 76
B.
The PTO’s Objectives ................................................ 80
1.
Self-Interested Bureaucrat ............................ 80
2.
Benevolent-but-Resource-Constrained
Bureaucrat .................................................... 83
II.
THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF THE AGENCY’S
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES ....................................................... 85
A.
Renewal Rates .......................................................... 88


Assistant Professor of Law & Director of Law and Economics Program, Cornell Law
School. J.D., Ph.D.
**
Assistant Professor of Law & Richard W. and Marie L. Corman Scholar, University of
Illinois College of Law. J.D., Ph.D.
The work was funded in part by University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign Research
Board, Award 12088. We thank David Abrams, Michael Burstein, Michael Carrier, Daniel Chen,
I. Glenn Cohen, Kevin Collins, Dennis Crouch, Peter DiCola, Michael Dorf, Rochelle Dreyfuss,
Rebecca Eisenberg, Einer Elhauge, John Golden, Stuart Graham, Valerie Hans, Michael Heise,
Paul Heald, Daniel Ho, David Hyman, Jay Kesan, Bob Lawless, Mark Lemley, Oskar Liivak,
Jonathan Masur, Michael Meurer, Joseph Miller, Arti Rai, Benjamin Roin, Bhaven Sampat,
David Schwartz, Sean Seymore, Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, three anonymous
reviewers, and the participants at the 5th Annual Junior Scholars in Intellectual Property
Workshop, American Law & Economics Association 2012 Annual Meeting, Cardozo IP Series,
PatCon2, University of Illinois Faculty Retreat, Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property
Colloquium 2012, IP Speaker Series at George Washington Law School, Midwestern Law &
Economics Association 2012 Annual Meeting, 7th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal
Studies, Patent Statistics for Decision Makers 2012, and faculty presentation at Northwestern
Law School for useful comments.

67

2b. FrakesWasserman_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

68

1/18/2013 11:57 AM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1:67

1.

The Self-Interested, Budget-Maximizing
PTO ............................................................... 89
2.
The Benevolent-but-ResourcedConstrained PTO ........................................... 89
B.
Entity Size ............................................................... 91
1.
The Self-Interested, Budget-Maximizing
PTO ............................................................... 91
2.
The Benevolent-but-ResourcedConstrained PTO ........................................... 91
III.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY ................................................... 92
A.
Data Sources and Key Variables .............................. 92
B.
Methodology ............................................................. 96
1.
Difference-in-Difference Analysis .................. 96
2.
Financial-Sustainability Analysis ................. 99
IV.
RESULTS ........................................................................... 101
A.
Difference-in-Difference Results: Renewal-Rate
Specifications ......................................................... 102
1.
Primary Difference-in-Difference Results ... 102
2.
Sustainability-Interaction Results .............. 105
B.
Difference-in-Difference Results: Entity-Size
Specifications ......................................................... 107
1.
Primary Difference-in-Difference Results ... 107
2.
Sustainability-Interaction Results .............. 109
C.
Interactions with Fee-Diversion Policy. .................. 109
D.
Dynamic Difference-in-Difference Regression
Results ................................................................... 110
E.
Robustness / Specification Checks ......................... 115
F.
Results Summary and Implications ....................... 118
V.
IMPLICATIONS AND REDUCING THE PTO’S FINANCIAL
INCENTIVE TO GRANT PATENTS ......................................... 119
A.
Implications of the America Invents Act ................. 120
B.
Reducing the PTO’s Financial Incentives to
Grant Patents ......................................................... 121
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 124
INTRODUCTION
In 1991, Congress changed the mechanism by which the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) was funded. The result
was that the Agency, whose principal task is to determine whether an
invention merits the reward of a patent, became almost entirely
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funded through user fees.1 Since 1991, the PTO’s budget has largely
been derived from patent examination and post-allowance fees.2 While
patent processing comprises the majority of the Agency’s operational
expenses, patent examination fees cover less than one-third of the
examination costs.3 As a result, the Agency is heavily dependent on
post-allowance fees—fees the PTO only collects when it grants a
patent—to fund its operations. This congressionally set fee structure
creates a possible financial incentive for the PTO to grant patents,
although the extent to which the Agency will act on this incentive
depends both on the PTO’s objectives and its needs. Thus, the 1991
variation in the law affords the opportunity to explore an important
issue in administrative law—the relationship between agency funding
and agency decisionmaking—and an important issue in patent law—
whether the PTO is biased toward issuing patents.
To the best of our knowledge, this Article undertakes the first
attempt to causally investigate the influence of the PTO’s funding on
the Agency’s decisionmaking (i.e., causal in the sense of statistically
ruling out other potentially confounding factors).4 Through this causal
investigation, it also builds upon those studies that have attempted—
albeit, more indirectly than the present study—to challenge the
hypothesis that the PTO’s granting decisions are solely guided by the
nonbiased application of patentability standards.5 To this extent, we
1.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 10101, 104 Stat.
1388.
2.
See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 55 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT], available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2010/USPTOFY2010PAR.pdf
(stating that approximately 85% of total patent income comes from maintenance fees; fees for
initial application filing, search, and examination; and issue fees).
3.
See id. at 55, 57 (showing that although filing, search, and examination fees amount to
only 28.7% of patent revenue, the “USPTO directs maximum resources to the priority functions
of patent and trademark examination”).
4.
One study by Deepak Hegde has theorized that the PTO’s appropriation process (but
not the fee schedule) affects patent backlog and patent pendency. However, unlike our analysis,
Hegde’s analysis, which relies upon graphical time series evidence, was not designed to
statistically identify (i.e., isolate) the actual relationship between the Agency’s funding and
outcome of interest. Moreover, Hegde did not explore how the PTO’s fee schedule affects patent
outcomes nor did he explore how the PTO’s appropriation process affects the Agency’s decision to
grant a patent. Deepak Hegde, Funding and Performance at the US Patent and Trademark
Office, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 148 (2012).
5.
A number of scholars have set forth evidence that indirectly (noncausally) bears on the
question of whether the U.S. PTO is biased in its decisionmaking. For instance, scholars have
compared the growth of patent families—patents that are directed to the same underlying
inventions that are filed in multiple countries—that originated in the United States with
successful applications in the United States by U.S. inventors and found the latter to have grown
over twice as much as the former. They have reasoned that this difference supports declining
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set forth a theoretical model that predicts that, under certain Agency
objectives, particular elements of the PTO’s fee structure create
incentives for the PTO to grant additional patents. Using a rich
database of previously unavailable patent data, we then empirically
test the predictions of this model by comparing the Agency’s granting
patterns before and after the period the PTO became fully user-fee
funded.6
Our results suggest that the Agency’s fee schedule biases the
PTO toward granting patents. For instance, with respect to those
types of patents for which the PTO is likely to profit the most from
granting, we estimate a relatively stronger sensitivity to the PTO’s
funding structure. More specifically, our findings suggest the PTO is
preferentially granting patents on technologies with high renewal
rates and patents filed by large entities, as the PTO stands to earn the
most revenue by granting additional patents of these types.
Furthermore, we also find that these distortions are more likely to
occur when markers indicative of an underfunded PTO are present. As
such, a more general implication of this analysis is that the PTO does
not appear to seek a universal expansion of its budget. Rather, the
evidence is more consistent with a view that distortions in the PTO’s
granting patterns are more likely to occur when the Agency is
financially constrained.
Our findings have broad implications for both policy and
theory. Regarding social welfare policy, our results are discouraging,
as they suggest that the PTO’s financial incentives, and not solely the
merits of the invention, may in part be driving patentability decisions.
Standard economic theory predicts that distortions in the PTO’s
granting behavior may result in substantial harm to society. While
patents attempt to push society toward an optimal level of innovation
by providing inventors with a mechanism to recoup their research and
development expenses, they do so only at a cost—consumers pay

standards of the U.S. PTO, conceivably as a result of internal biases within the PTO. See, e.g.,
ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 136–38, 142–43 (2004). Other
scholars have put forth indirect evidence of a PTO bias by suggesting that the decisions of a
certain group of examiners may be driven, in part, by considerations other than patentability
standards. See generally Mark Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and the
Patent Office Outcomes, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 817 (2012) (finding that more experienced
examiners cite less prior art and are more likely to grant patents). While these studies provide
valuable information, they have not been designed to causally identify a PTO bias, as we attempt
to do in this Article. For instance, the Jaffe and Lerner analysis, while indeed suggestive of a
number of possible biases, is not designed to statistically identify any particular bias as being
responsible for the observed decline in patentability standards within the United States.
6.
Details on the database are provided in Part III infra.
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higher prices and have less access to the patented invention.7 A PTO
that is applying the patentability standards in a patent-protective
manner is likely to be routinely granting patents on inventions that
were either already known or represent only a trivial advancement
over the existing scientific knowledge.8 As a result, a grant-biased
PTO is likely to systematically issue patents that end up imposing
significant costs on society without bestowing the commensurate
benefits of innovation.9
Our results are also relevant to the ongoing policy debate in
Congress and elsewhere on how best to fix the “broken” patent
system.10 Criticism of the patent system has largely coalesced around
one charge: the PTO permits too many invalid patents to issue, which
unnecessarily drains consumer welfare.11 Both the Supreme Court’s
renewed interest in substantive patent law and the enactment of the
America Invents Act, which represents the first major overhaul of the
patent system in over sixty years, were driven in part by this

7.
See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 76 (1969) (explaining the need for finding the optimal
patent length, because the longer a patent lasts, the greater the social cost of that patent due to
inefficiencies caused by monopoly of information); Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable
Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863, 867 (2000) (discussing the costs of “patent thickets”); Keith
Leffler & Christofer Leffler, Efficiency Trade-offs in Patent Litigation Settlements: Analysis Gone
Astray?, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 33, 33 (2004) (stating that the “static inefficiency” caused by valuable
patents causes consumer welfare to suffer due to high prices).
8.
Not surprisingly, the patentability standards reflect a careful balance between
encouraging innovation and drains on consumer welfare. In order for an invention to be patent
eligible, it must both be new and represent a nontrivial advancement over current scientific
understanding. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). If an invention was obvious to the person of ordinary skill
in the art or was already in the public domain, the invention would have likely arisen without
the patent incentive. In contrast, an invention that represents a significant advancement in the
art may not have arisen but for the patent inducement.
9.
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 77 (2005).
10. See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY,
THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009); JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 5.
11. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at http:///www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/
innovationrpt.pdf (discussing how poor quality patents harm innovation); Mark A. Lemley,
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495 n.1 (2001) (citing a litany
of sources critical of the PTO for issuing invalid patents); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is
the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 185 (2008) (noting the widespread
consensus that the PTO is routinely issuing invalid patents that impose costs upon the public);
Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 45, 47 n.5 (2007) (citing a number of sources calling for reform of the patent system
because the PTO is issuing a large number of undeserving patents); John R. Thomas, Collusion
and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
305, 320–22 (demarcating the social costs associated with improvidently issued patents).
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concern.12 Yet our findings suggest this charge is underinclusive, as
they provide evidence that the PTO is not only likely biased toward
issuing patents but also that the Agency is likely biased toward
issuing particular types of patents—those with a high probability of
being renewed or those that are filed by large entities. Of course,
eliminating the Agency’s overgranting tendencies requires not only an
understanding of the extent of its bias but also the mechanisms that
create pressure on the Agency to issue patents. Unfortunately, up to
this point, there has been a failure on both counts.13 As a result, recent
patent reform efforts are unlikely to eliminate the granting pressure
identified in this Article.14
From a policy perspective, our results also suggest that
congressional action intended to promote innovation with respect to
entrepreneurs and small firms may have the exact opposite effect.
Largely in recognition that individuals and small entities both
constitute a significant source of innovative activity and rely more
heavily on the patent system than larger enterprises, Congress
provided a 50% reduction in patent fees to these entities.15 Yet we find
evidence that this reduction in patent fees has the unintended
consequence of likely biasing the PTO toward granting patents
associated with large enterprises. Thus, it is possible that the alleged
benefits small entities obtain by paying reduced patent fees are
outweighed by the harms they experience in the marketplace because
the PTO is extending preferential treatment toward large entities.
On a theoretical level, our modeling of the various ways in
which the PTO may distort its practices in light of its funding
structure builds on, and fills various gaps in, a literature that has
attributed the PTO’s perceived bias toward issuing patents to a
number of causes.16 To the extent scholars have posited that the PTO’s
12. Lemley & Sampat, supra note 11, at 185.
13. See infra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part V.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) (2006).
16. For example, scholars have argued that the PTO is so underfunded and, hence,
hamstrung from spending sufficient time examining patent applications to reject patents, see,
e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 5, at 130–33 (describing the PTO’s budgetary woes); Lemley,
supra note 11, at 1500 (noting that examiners spend on average only eighteen hours reviewing a
patent application), that the patent examiners compensation system favors allowances, see, e.g.,
THOMAS H. STANTON ET AL., NAT'L ACAD. OF PUBLIC ADMIN., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE:
TRANSFORMING TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY 102 (2005), available at
http://www2.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Issues_and_Advocacy/Comments2/Patent_and_Tr
ademark_Office/20055/NAPAFullReport.pdf (paraphrasing one patent examiner’s statement
saying that the productivity schedule is “highly biased toward early allowances”); Clarisa Long,
The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1991 (2009)
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user-fee income may bias the Agency toward issuing patents, they
have done so chiefly under the simple premise that funding the PTO
through fees paid by patent applicants may lead it to make decisions
that favor applicants (i.e., grant patents) at the expense of the public
(i.e., apply the patentability standards in a nonbiased fashion).17 One
of us has previously argued that by ignoring the structure of user fees,
legal scholarship has overlooked the import that the more finegrained, structural components of agency financing may play in
influencing agency decisionmaking.18 This Article builds on this
previous work by exploring how various PTO objectives would interact
(“Internal PTO practices create a bias in favor of granting patents.”); Robert P. Merges, As Many
as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent
System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 607 (1999) (“Consequently, the only way to earn
bonus points with confidence is to allow a patent application.”); Thomas, supra note 11, at 324–
25 (discussing the PTO’s employee shortage and employee compensation structure contribute to
disproportionate amounts of patent allowances), that the asymmetric review of the Agency’s
decisions bias it toward expanding substantive patent law, Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s
Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 401–
06 (2011), and that the burden of proof is on the examiner to show that a patent should not issue,
Thomas, supra note 11, at 325 (“Long-established practice places the burden of persuasion and
initial burden of production upon examiners to generate rejections.”).
17. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 314 (2007) (“[PTO] is
favorably disposed to patent holders . . . [in part because] the Agency as a whole is funded by
applicant fees.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 579 n.178 (2009) (“A
pro-patent bias also arises because the PTO is wholly funded by patent-applicant fees.”); Long,
supra note 16, at 1994 (“[T]he PTO’s budgetary structure . . . creates the incentive for the PTO to
favor patentees (who pay fees to the PTO) over nonpatentees (who do not).”); Michael J. Meurer,
Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 699 (2009) (“The PTO has endorsed
a ‘customer service’ orientation that stresses the importance of meeting the needs of patent
applicants. This orientation may be motivated in part by the dependence of the agency on fees to
fund its operation.”).
18. While at least two scholars have noted the current fee structure may bias the Agency to
grant patents, they have not begun to explore how the PTO may have a differential bias across
patent type. Compare Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s
Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2062 (2009) (“[T]he current fee
structure also sets up an obvious financial incentive for the PTO to grant patents.”), and Long,
supra note 16, at 1994 (“[T]he PTO’s budgetary structure creates a bias in favor of granting
patents and encouraging inventors to apply for patents.”), with Wasserman, supra note 16, at
407–14 (asserting that the PTO’s budgetary structure favors granting patents that are likely to
earn the most revenue—i.e., patents directed toward technologies with high renewal rates and
patents issued to large entities).
This gap in the literature is all the more puzzling in consideration of the substantial
literature regarding the incentives created by various fee structures and compensation
structures in other decisionmaking contexts. To provide one example, scholars in health
economics, law, and policy have long acknowledged the expansionary distortions in physician
decisionmaking that may follow from a “fee-for-service” payment system that more generously
compensates physicians for providing their patients with a greater quantity of medical services,
such as office visits, procedures, and tests. See, e.g., Thomas G. McGuire, Physician Agency, in
HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 461, 517–19 (A.J. Culyer & J.P. Newhouse eds., 2000).
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with both the Agency’s fee structure and the nuances of the PTO’s
budgetary process and, of course, empirically testing the hypotheses
that result from this exploration.
Despite a general perception in the literature that the PTO is
routinely granting bad patents,19 it is important that scholars turn to
an empirical analysis of PTO decisionmaking, as we endeavor to do in
this Article, in order to understand whether the PTO is, in fact,
deviating from otherwise optimal practices. After all, there are at least
three reasons to doubt that the Agency’s funding mechanism would
bias the PTO toward issuing patents. First, as administrative law
scholars have long debated, the nature or objectives of high-level
agency administrators are unclear.20 Do bureaucrats seek larger
budgets for self-interested reasons or solely to better accomplish the
Agency’s mission? Second, Congress has never given the PTO the
authority to spend all of the fees it collects, potentially blunting any
incentives of the PTO to grant additional patents in an attempt to
expand its budget.21 Third, emphasizing the autonomous nature of
individual patent examiners and the difficulties involved in
supervising examiners,22 the current literature has questioned the
19.
20.

See sources cited supra note 11.
Compare WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 38–42 (1971) (arguing that bureaucrats seek enlarged budgets because they are
positively correlated with other goods the bureaucrat values such as power, prestige, and salary),
and THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISAL AND EVIDENCE (Andre Blais & Stephane
Dion eds., 1991) (aggregating a number of essays and studies that support the assertion that
bureaucrats seek enlarged budgets), with JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 182 (1989) (“The view that all bureaus want larger budgets
ignores the fact that there is often a tradeoff between bigger budgets on the one hand and the
complexity of tasks, the number of rivals, and the multiplicity of constraints on the other.”),
Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915
(2005) (arguing that empire-building of agencies is overstated because bureaucrats do not have
the same motives as corporate leaders), and Michael A. Livermore, Cause or Cure? Cost-Benefit
Analysis and Regulatory Gridlock, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 120 (2008) (challenging the notion
that bureaucrats will always seek to increase budgets).
21. See infra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 1541, 1544, 1551, 1559–60 (2009) (noting the PTO’s difficulties in controlling patent
examiner’s output); Meurer, supra note 17, at 700 (detailing the difficulties associated with
implementing reforms affecting patent examiners).
Several scholars have found that patent examiner characteristics have an effect on patent
outcomes. See, e.g., Iain M. Cockburn et al., Are All Patent Examiners Equal? Examiners, Patent
Characteristics, and Litigation Outcomes, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE BASED ECONOMY 19
(Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., Nat’l Acads. Press 2003) (finding that differences in
examiners explain a significant percentage of the variation in the characteristics of issued
patents, and that some examiners are more likely than others to have their patents upheld in
court); Lemley & Sampat, supra note 5 (finding that more experienced examiners cite less prior
art and are more likely to grant patents); Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History
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ability of the PTO to enact top-down directives, such as pressure to
grant more patents (especially in targeted areas).23
Finally, our findings also shed light on some of the abovementioned ambiguities surrounding agency responsiveness to
financial incentives. Our results contradict the idea that bureaucrats
seek to maximize their budgets for self-interested reasons—i.e., in an
effort to increase their own salaries, prestige, or advancement.
Instead, our findings suggest that, to the extent bureaucrats seek
enlarged budgets, they do so as a result of being mission minded but
resource constrained.
The rest of the Article is organized as follows. Part I delineates
the PTO’s possible financial incentives to grant patents and begins to
explore the extent to which the PTO will act on this incentive by
introducing two competing models of agency behavior: the selfinterested PTO and the benevolent PTO. Part II further refines these
models of agency behavior by examining how the PTO’s financial
incentives likely vary across patent types. Part II also introduces the
predictions of these models, which serve as the hypotheses that will
guide our empirical analysis. Part III describes the data set and
methodology utilized. The results of our empirical analysis are
presented in Part IV. Part V begins to explore the implications of our
results and also assesses potential methods to reduce the PTO’s
financial tendency toward issuing patents. This Part also concludes
that the recently enacted America Invents Act, which grants the PTO
fee-setting authority, is unlikely to extinguish the PTO’s financial
predisposition to grant patents.
I. THE PTO’S FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND ITS OBJECTIVES
This section describes how the PTO’s current budgetary
process, including its fee schedule, sets up possible financial incentives
to grant patents.24 It next turns to examining when and if the PTO is
likely to act on those financial incentives by exploring two competing
models of agency behavior: the self-interested PTO who desires to
maximize its budget and the benevolent-but-resource-constrained PTO

Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 151 (2004) (finding that certain examiners more systematically
required applicants to narrow the scope of their patents).
23. See, e.g., Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 22, at 1559–60, 1563–64 (discussing the
difficulty the PTO has controlling examiner conduct despite strict rules and oversight).
24. We use the term patents in this Article to refer to “utility” patents. A utility patent
protects the way an article is used and works. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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who seeks additional funding in order to match its revenue with its
expenses.
A. The PTO’s Budget Process and Its Possible Financial Incentives to
Grant Patents
Historically, the PTO has been funded largely by taxpayer
revenues. In 1991, the Agency was made to essentially fund its entire
operations through user fees.25 The PTO, however, was not given feesetting authority—Congress chose to remain the sole arbitrator of
patent fee levels.26 Importantly, Congress also did not give the Agency
the right to automatically spend its fee collections; instead the PTO
must receive congressional approval through annual appropriations to
utilize its fee revenue.27
Prior to 2004, Congress routinely set the Agency’s budget to a
level that was essentially below both its estimated and actual fee
collections.28 Since 2004, the Agency’s spending authority has been
25. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 10101, 104 Stat.
1388. The PTO’s budget in 1991 was over three hundred and seventy million dollars, of which
three million were from general revenue funds. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 1991
ANNUAL REPORT 1–2 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 ANNUAL REPORT].
26. The PTO only recently obtained fee-setting authority. Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10(a), 125 Stat. 284, 316 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C.A. § 41 (West
2012)). Prior to 2011, the PTO lacked fee-setting authority and any significant change in the
filing fees, issuance fees, and maintenance fees required congressional action. See 35 U.S.C. §
41(d) (2006) (amended 2011) (limiting the PTO’s discretion in setting fees to minor issues such as
“processing, services, or materials”).
27. The PTO is funded through discretionary spending, which means that Congress
evaluates the Agency and its funding needs annually during the appropriations cycle. See
Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process,
35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387, 398–400 (1998) (describing discretionary spending and the budget
process generally).
28. In 1991, when Congress made the Agency essentially user-fee funded it concomitantly
enacted a 69% surcharge on certain patent fees. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 10101(a), 104 Stat. 1388. From the fiscal years of 1991 to 1998, fees
collected from users were fully available to the PTO; however, surcharge revenue was not.
Starting in the fiscal year of 1992, Congress limited the Agency’s ability to spend surcharge fees,
using the fees to fund other government programs. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-199, div. B, tit. II, 118 Stat. 3.
In 1999 the surcharge fees expired. From 1999 to 2003, Congress made a certain dollar
amount of fees unavailable for PTO use each year and then, in differing amounts over the years,
allowed the Agency to use some, but not all, of the prior year’s fees. The result, however, was
that for the fiscal years of 1999 to 2003, the Agency’s budget was essentially set below its
estimated fee collections. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 54 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT], available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2003/2003
annualreport.pdf; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 54 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 PERFORMANCE AND
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capped at its projected revenue stream, which has resulted in the
PTO’s budget being larger than its fee collections at times.29 When the
PTO’s fee collections fall below its appropriated budget, the Agency
will experience a budgetary shortfall, as Congress does not provide the
Agency with the difference.30 In contrast, if the PTO’s fee collections
surpass its spending authority, the excess fees are not immediately
available to the PTO.31 On occasion, the PTO has obtained
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT], available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2002/158.pdf; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL
YEAR 2001, at 58 (2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2001/
01performreport.pdf; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2000, at 49 (2000), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/
stratplan/ar/2000/00findisc.pdf; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, A PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE REVIEW: CENTURY OF AMERICAN INVENTION, FISCAL YEAR 1999, at 28 (1999), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/1999/99mssgchief.pdf. For example, in the fiscal year of
2002 the PTO estimated its fee collections would total $1,346 million. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND
BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2002, APPENDIX, DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE 227 (2002), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2002-APP/pdf
/BUDGET-2002-APP-1-6.pdf. That year, Congress chose to set the office’s budgetary resources
for spending to $1,146.7 million, of which $282.3 million was from fees collected in fiscal years
2000 and 2001. Congress also appropriated $843.7 million from fees collected during fiscal year
2002; however, $304.1 million from fees collected during fiscal year 2002 was not available for
spending. 2002 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra, at 54.
29. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 60 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT],
available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2004/2004annualreport.pdf; U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 80
(2005) [hereinafter 2005 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT], available at
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2005/2005annualreport.pdf; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 83 (2006)
[hereinafter 2006 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT], available at http://www.uspto
.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2006/2006annualreport.pdf; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 53 (2007) [hereinafter 2007
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT], available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/
ar/2007/2007annualreport.pdf.
30. This occurred in the fiscal years of 2005, 2006, 2008, and 2009. 2005 PERFORMANCE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 29, at 80 (PTO was appropriated up to $1.554 million
but only collected $1.497 million in fees); 2006 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT,
supra note 29, at 83 (PTO was appropriated up to $1.683 million but only collected $1.554 million
in fees); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL
YEAR 2008, at 54 (2008), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2008/
2008annualreport.pdf (PTO was appropriated up to $1.915 million but only collected $1.879
million in fees); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 47 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT], available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2009/2009annualreport.pdf (PTO
was appropriated up to $2.010 million but only collected $1.874 million in fees).
31. This occurred in the fiscal years of 1992–2004, 2007, 2010, and 2011. 2003
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 28, at 47 (stating that PTO fee
collections exceeded spending authority); 2004 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT,
supra note 29, at 80; 2007 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 29, at 53;
2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 2, at 99; U.S. PATENT &
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supplemental appropriations from Congress enabling the Agency to
use all or a portion of these excess fees.32 More typically, the excess
fees are utilized by Congress to fund other government operations.33
This practice, known as fee diversion, first occurred in 1992 and
appears to have peaked in the late 1990s to the early 2000s.34 We
revisit the nuances of this quasi-appropriations process when
discussing the incentives posed by the practice of fee diversion in Part
IV below. To illustrate the incentives posed by the Agency’s fee
structure, however, we proceed by simply viewing the PTO as
operating off of the user fees that it collects.
Since the PTO became essentially fully user-fee funded,
roughly 85% of its patent operating budget is garnered through three
types of fees: (1) filing, search, and examination fees (collectively
referred to as examination fees), (2) issuance fees, and (3)
maintenance or renewal fees.35 Examination fees are paid at the time
the application is filed, issuance fees are paid at the time a patent
TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 67
(2011) [hereinafter 2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT], available at
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2011/USPTOFY2011PAR.pdf.
32. See, e.g., United States Patent and Trademark Office Supplemental Appropriations
Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-224, 124 Stat. 2385 (designating a supplemental appropriation in the
fiscal year of 2010 enabling the PTO to spend an additional $129 million in fee collections,
bringing the PTO’s spending authority up to $2.016 billion in fee collections).
33. In theory these surplus fees may become available to the Agency in future years—the
PTO still has these fees on its books as “temporarily unavailable.” See, e.g., 2011 PERFORMANCE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 31, at 67. However, it is widely believed that the PTO
is unlikely to ever receive the authority to spend these fees, at least not any significant portion of
them. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, UNDERSTANDING PATENT FEE DIVERSION AND HOW IT
IS AFFECTED BY CURRENT SENATE AND HOUSE PATENT REFORM BILLS 1 (2011), available at
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&ContentID=30761&Template=/CM/Conten
tDisplay.cfm (“No one expects that these fees will ever be made available to the USPTO.”).
34. Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass’n, User Fees Diverted from the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) 1991-2005, INTELL. PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, http://www.ipo.org/
AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search&section=USPTO_Fees_and_Funding&template=/CM/Content
Display.cfm&ContentFileID=2294 (last modified Dec. 16, 2004). Importantly, the America
Invents Act does not conclusively end the practice of fee diversion, although it arguably
diminishes the chances it will occur. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 22, 125 Stat. 284, 336 (2011). The
America Invents Act creates a new account, known as the “reserve fund,” wherein fees the PTO
collects above its appropriated budget are deposited, but does not guarantee the PTO access to
these fees. Id. The language of the Act defers to future appropriations bills as to this matter;
therefore, it appears to leave open the possibility that fee diversion may occur in the future. See
id.
35. 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 2, at 55 (stating that
approximately 84% of total patent income comes from maintenance fees, fees related to initial
application for filing, search, and examination, and issue fees); U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
A PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW: WORKING FOR OUR CUSTOMERS, FISCAL YEAR 1994,
at 59 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 ANNUAL REPORT] (stating that approximately 83% of total patent
income comes from maintenance fees, filing fees, and issue fees).
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application is granted, and maintenance fees are paid periodically over
the lifetime of an issued patent so that the patent can remain
enforceable.
While examination fees account for approximately 30% of the
PTO budget, these fees fail to cover the actual cost incurred by the
PTO to examine applications.36 Consider, for example, that in the
fiscal year of 2011 the PTO estimated that the average cost of
examining a patent application was approximately $3,600.37 Yet,
during the fiscal year of 2011 the examination fee was set at $1,090
for large for-profit corporations and half that amount for individuals,
small firms, nonprofit corporations, or other enterprises that qualify
for “small entity” status.38 Therefore, the level of examination fees
covered less than one-third of the actual examination costs for large
corporations and less than one-sixth of actual costs for small entities.
The PTO is heavily dependent on issuance fees and
maintenance fees, which account for over 50% of the PTO’s patent
budget, to fund its operations.39 These post-allowance fees are
typically larger than the examination fees. In the fiscal year of 2011,
the issuance fee was set at $1,510, and the maintenance fees that are
due at three-and-a-half, seven-and-a-half, and eleven-and-a-half years
from the date the patent issues were $980, $2,480, and $4,110,
respectively.40 Again, small entities pay half these amounts. The
result is that the vast majority of the PTO’s budget is gained through
fees that the Agency collects only if a patent is granted. Further, the
majority of the Agency’s operational costs are incurred by processing
patents;41 the expenses associated with issuing and maintaining a
patent are minimal.42 Thus, these post-allowance fees are almost

36. 2009 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 30, at 49 (stating 31.3%
of total patent income comes from filing, search, and examination fees).
37. 2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 31, at 17 (stating that in
2011 the average patent cost $3,594 to examine).
38. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(a)(1) (2011) (listing a basic filing fee of $330 and $165 for a small
entity); 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(k) (listing a utility search fee of $540 and $270 for a small entity); 37
C.F.R. § 1.16(o) (listing a utility examination fee of $220 and $110 for a small entity). Entities
defined by the PTO as “small” include individuals, nonprofit corporations, or corporations that
qualify as small businesses under the Small Business Act. 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(a)(1)–(3).
39. See 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 2, at 56 (noting that
“renewals [fees] recoup costs incurred during the initial patent process”).
40. 37 C.F.R. § 1.18(a) (utility fee); §§ 1.20(e)–(g) (maintenance fees).
41. 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 3 fig.1 (noting that patent processing
constituted 51% of the PTO’s total obligations).
42. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-97-113, FEES ARE NOT ALWAYS
COMMENSURATE WITH THE COSTS OF SERVICES 26 (1997) (noting that “only 8.6 percent of the
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exclusively used to fund other Agency activity. The back-end fee
structure and the inadequacies of the examination fees both provide a
possible incentive for the PTO to grant rather than deny patents. The
extent to which the PTO would act on either of these inducements
depends, in part, on the objectives of the Agency and its needs.
B. The PTO’s Objectives
The decisions of agencies, like those of many other entities, are
influenced by a variety of factors. The purpose of this Section is not to
elucidate every factor that may affect agency decisionmaking but
instead to establish that under certain situations monetary concerns
are likely to influence the decisionmaking process of the PTO. To this
effect, this Section outlines two competing models of agency behavior.
The first model assumes a self-interested bureaucrat who desires to
maximize the Agency’s budget. For this bureaucrat, the existence of
post-allowance fees will bias the PTO toward allowing patents. The
second model supposes a benevolent bureaucrat that is resource
constrained. Unlike the self-interested bureaucrat, the benevolent
bureaucrat’s bias toward granting patents may stem solely from the
PTO’s examination fees failing to cover the Agency’s examination
expenses. However, even if examination fees were adequate, a
benevolent bureaucrat may apply the patentability standards in a
patent-protective direction if the Agency’s overall fee collections failed
to cover its operational expenses.
1. Self-Interested Bureaucrat
To begin, we envision a state of the world in which the PTO
resembles the imperialistic maximizing bureaucrat theorized by
William Niskanen.43 Niskanen posits that bureaucrats seek to
maximize agency budgets because budgets are positively correlated
with other goods that a bureaucrat values, such as compensation,
prestige, power, and prospects for advancement.44 In other words,
Niskanen contemplates a self-interested bureaucrat that puts his own
costs associated with an individual patent were attributable to the actual issue of the patent and
0.1 percent were attributable to its maintenance”).
43. See generally Andre Blais & Stephane Dion, Introduction to THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING
BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISAL AND EVIDENCE, supra note 20, at 3–11; WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR.,
BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 38 (1971).
44. Robert A. Young, Budget Size and Bureaucratic Careers, in THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING
BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISAL AND EVIDENCE, supra note 20, at 33 (citing NISKANEN, supra note 43,
at 38).
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interests above those of the public.45 Under Niskanen’s view, it is the
existence of informational asymmetries that enables high-level
administrators to extract ever-increasing budgets from Congress.46
The universal nature of the maximizing bureaucrat, however,
has been questioned.47 One line of challenge focuses on the extent to
which high-level administrators actually profit from enlarged budgets.
Even if bureaucrats were primarily self-interested there is little
empirical evidence that high-level administrators accrue larger
salaries when a bureau’s budget grows.48 Of course, there is still the
possibility that such administrators seek larger budgets for intangible
benefits such as power and prestige.49 However, to date, there is little
empirical evidence that supports or refutes this latter hypothesis.50
Another line of inquiry has challenged Niskanen’s view that Congress
is easily duped into providing agencies with inflated budgets.51 By
delineating the multitude of ways in which the legislature and the
executive exert considerable influence over administrative agencies,
scholars have largely refuted Niskanen’s assumption that Congress is

45. NISKANEN, supra note 43, at 38.
46. Id. at 36–42.
47. See WILSON, supra note 20, at 182 (“The view that all bureaus want larger budgets
ignores the fact that there is often a tradeoff between bigger budgets on the one hand and the
complexity of tasks, the number of rivals, and the multiplicity of constraints on the other.”);
Levinson, supra note 20, at 916 (arguing that empire-building of agencies is overstated because
bureaucrats do not have the same motives as corporate leaders).
48. See Levinson, supra note 20, at 932 (“[T]he relationship between a larger agency budget
and higher salaries or cushier working conditions is empirically tenuous”); Young, supra note 44,
at 37–43 (concluding that studies on the relationship between budget growth and financial
benefits to bureaucrats “are unanimous in offering little support, even to the weak proposition
that bureaucrats become relatively better-off when the budget of their bureau grows
disproportionately”). Research shows that it is seniority, not the size of the Agency budgets, that
explains a substantial portion of salary increases. Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Agency
Growth, Salaries and the Protected Bureaucrat, 27 ECON. INQUIRY 431–51 (1989).
49. Andre Blais & Stephane Dion, Conclusion: Are Bureaucrats Budget Maximizers?, in
THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISAL AND EVIDENCE, supra note 20, at 357.
50. Id.
51. See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process,
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L.
REV. 431, 443 (1989) (describing the appropriations process as a “low cost route” politicians use
to prevent agency deviations from congressional goals); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas
Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlook: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 165, 170 (1984) (noting that “subcommittees controlling authorizations and appropriations
may be in a better position to do oversight than so-called oversight committees”); cf. Barry R.
Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory
Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 789 (1983) (finding
congressional preferences over agency action to be a statistically significant factor).
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submissive in setting agencies’ budgets.52 Of course, Niskanen’s views
may continue to hold some relevance in that it remains possible, even
likely, that both Congress and bureaucrats play influential roles in the
budgetary process.53 Accordingly, we consider the manner in which a
self-interested PTO of the Niskanen variety would seek to expand its
budget.
While the PTO’s budgetary process provides the Agency with
multiple pathways to satisfy its maximizing proclivities,54 arguably
the easiest way for the Agency to increase its budget is to grant more
patents. In this scenario, the PTO exploits its informational monopoly
on the socially optimal grant rate to artificially inflate its fee
collections (and hence the budget that it requests reflecting those
inflated fee collections). At the extreme, a self-interested PTO would
grant every patent, as the existence of back-end fees means the
Agency can maximize its fee collections by maximizing its patent
grants (this is true whether or not the Agency’s examination fees
covered the full operational expenses of the PTO). However, there are
a number of reasons why the Agency would not adopt such an
excessive practice, including the fact that Congress is unlikely to
believe that a 100% grant rate is optimal. Nonetheless, a selfinterested PTO can still increase its budget by biasing the Agency
toward granting patents, as long as its distortionary bias remains
under the threshold of congressional detection.

52. Id.
53. There is empirical evidence that suggests bureaucrats have a substantial impact on
budgetary outcomes and that this impact usually results in larger budgets. Jean-Michel
Cousineau & Anne-Marie Girard, Public Sector Unions, Government Expenditures, and the
Bureaucratic Model, in THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISAL AND EVIDENCE, supra
note 20, at 259 (finding that the presence of a public sector union in a municipality tends to
increase government expenditures by about six percent).
54. Of course, the PTO could seek to increase its budget by lobbying Congress for fee
increases. In this scenario, the PTO could leverage its informational monopoly on the true cost of
examining patent applications to extract temporary or long-term fee increases from Congress.
Because the Agency’s budget is generally set to its estimated fee collections, any increase in fee
levels will automatically translate into a larger budget. Niskanen’s model predicts that the PTO
would repeatedly and routinely ask for needless fee increases. The Agency has enjoyed some
success in lobbying for larger fees, but its success has been far from universal. See infra note 57.
The Agency could also lobby for enhanced fee-setting authority. To the extent that the PTO
could control its fee levels, the PTO could increase its fees in an effort to enlarge its own budget.
Arguably, biasing the Agency toward granting patents is the easiest pathway to increase the
PTO’s budget, as this requires the least congressional action.
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2. Benevolent-but-Resource-Constrained Bureaucrat
The PTO bureaucrat, however, does not need to be selfinterested in order to seek a larger budget. High-level administrators
may also seek more abundant budgets because of their values; there is
ample evidence that many civil servants are mission minded.55 The
“benevolent bureaucrat” is a high-level administrator who attempts to
increase agency funding solely for the purpose of allowing the agency
to better accomplish its mission.
While the benevolent PTO’s preferred method of augmenting
the Agency’s budget is to lobby Congress for increased fee levels,56 this
approach is unlikely to yield routine success.57 Thus, in certain
situations even an administrator that is only attempting to better
accomplish the PTO’s mission may bias the Agency toward issuing
patents in an effort to augment the Agency’s budget.
Congress has stipulated that the PTO funds its entire
operations through fee revenue.58 Yet, at the same time, Congress set
the Agency’s fee structure so that examination fees fail to cover twothirds of the Agency’s costs to examine patent applications. The
inadequacy of the examination fees necessitates the Agency’s
dependence on post-allowance fees to subsidize the examination
process. More generally, the fact that half of the Agency’s budget
55. See KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY,
BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 347–48 (1997); Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., The Budget-Maximizing
Bureaucrat: Is There a Case?, in THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISALS AND
EVIDENCE, supra note 20, at 66 (discussing case studies that indicate many civil servants are
mission minded).
56. This course of action would allow the PTO to increase its budget without distorting its
own granting behavior.
57. While there is general agreement that the PTO’s present budget is insufficient for the
Agency to carry out its expected responsibilities, FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION:
THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 10 (2003) (“Hearings
participants unanimously held the view that the PTO does not receive sufficient funding for its
responsibilities.”), Congress has on a number of occasions refused to increase fee levels. Fee
changes appear to be harder to enact when they are not supported by patent applicants. For
example, a 1990 and 1991 campaign to end small-entity status and a 2002 campaign to increase
fee levels and restructure fees were largely unsuccessful because patent applicants did not
support these increases. See Traci Watson, Patent Office Drops Plan to Raise Fees, 356 NATURE
645, 645 (1992) (noting that after “failing twice to convince Congress that small-scale inventors
do not deserve a price break, the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has dropped its
opposition to such a discount” and that “small inventors convinced Congress that a higher
maintenance fees [sic] would weaken the US economy”).
58. It was congressional intent that the fees the Agency collects cover the full operating
needs of the Agency. See WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20906, U.S. PATENT
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS: A BRIEF EXPLANATION 1 (2011) (reviewing
the Patent and Trademark Office’s funding as a result of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act).

2b. FrakesWasserman_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

84

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1/18/2013 11:57 AM

[Vol. 66:1:67

stems from these back-end fees suggests the PTO is heavily dependent
on these fees to cover its operational expenses. Accordingly, the PTO
must grant patents at a sufficiently high rate to recoup these costs.
It is of course possible that the Agency’s nonbiased grant rate—
i.e., the rate at which it would grant patents if it were solely applying
the patentability standards in a nonbiased fashion—is at a rate such
that the PTO would indeed be able to cover its operational costs. In
this instance, a benevolent PTO would not be bound by any resource
constraints and would thus feel no need to distort its granting
practices in an effort to generate additional fees. However, if this
otherwise nonbiased grant rate is such that its current stream of fee
collections based on these granting patterns is insufficient to cover the
Agency’s operational expenses—i.e., the Agency’s grant rate is below a
sustainability threshold rate—then the Agency will need to raise
additional revenues in order to achieve financial sustainability. In this
instance, the PTO may find itself inclined to increase its granting
tendencies in order to cover this shortfall.
A number of time-varying factors may disrupt the equilibrium
reached between the Agency’s back-end fees and front-end and other
operational costs and thus induce a bias toward granting. The PTO is
more likely to trigger its sustainability constraint and encounter an
imbalance between its back-end fees and examination or other
operational costs under two broad scenarios: (1) when its nonbiased
grant rate drops below the threshold rate required to break even,
taking as given all of those factors that shape the break-even
threshold (discussed below) or (2) when that threshold rate itself rises,
taking as given the PTO’s nonbiased rate of granting. This first
scenario may arise if the quality of the stream of incoming patents
deteriorates, leaving the PTO otherwise inclined to grant less
frequently. The second scenario (i.e., an increase in the threshold
sustainability rate) may materialize upon the occurrence, among
others, of the following developments: (1) patentees elect to pay their
maintenance fees at a lower rate, (2) aggregate examination costs rise
due to a shift in patent applications toward more complex technology
classes (to which the PTO allocates more examination hours), (3) the
aggregate incidence of small-entity applicants rises, and (4) patent
examinations demanded of the PTO increase (relative to the existing
stock of patents from which the PTO may collect post-allowance
fees).59 In each such instance, the indicated development will decrease
59. The PTO is dependent on renewal fees from patents that were issued three-and-a-half,
seven-and-a-half, and eleven-and-a-half years ago to sustain its processing of patent applications
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the ratio between the back-end fees to be collected by the PTO and the
obligatory operational costs of the PTO and thus, all else equal,
increase the rate at which the Agency must grant patents so that its
fees will be able to cover the Agency’s expenses.
In the event that any of the above developments do indeed
challenge the ability of the Agency to finance its operational costs
through the fees generated by its nonbiased patent grants, the
benevolent PTO may find that it is left with no other choice than to
increase its grant rate in order to break even.60
II. THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF THE AGENCY’S FINANCIAL
INCENTIVES
The previous Part established that the PTO can increase its fee
collections and hence likely its budget by granting additional patents,
and, in order to better understand when high-level administrators
would bias the PTO toward granting patents, introduced two different
models of agency behavior: the self-interested bureaucrat who desires
to maximize the Agency’s budget and a resource-constrained,
benevolent bureaucrat who desires to generate additional funds in
order to maintain financial sustainability. This Part further refines
these models by considering an additional nuance in Agency
decisionmaking: the PTO’s monetary incentives likely vary across
patent types. Although the Agency’s basic fee structure preferences
patent grants over denials, not all patents grants generate equal
revenue.61 As a result, the PTO may find that it will best achieve the
goals of self-interest or benevolence by granting more patents of
certain types relative to others. This Article examines two
today. However, the PTO is processing many more applications today than it was even four,
eight, or twelve years ago. As the ratio of the PTO’s fee levels has not dramatically changed over
time, it is unlikely that the fee levels were set to allow for such a dramatic growth in the volume
of processed patent applications. Thus, the PTO’s financial sustainability may be threatened
solely by the fact that the Agency, which is under continued pressure to expand its capacity to
examine patent applications in order to decrease its growing backlog, must fund its expansion in
processing capacity based on previously issued patents.
60. David S. Kim & Glenn M. Kubota, Behind the Scenes at the USPTO: Accounting for the
Supervisory Patent Examiner, MORRISON & FOERSTER Q. NEWS, Summer 2011, at 2, 3 (“One
former examiner recalled that allowances were being encouraged at the same time that USPTO
fee revenues were reported as being low.”). In an effort to reestablish financial equilibrium, the
PTO could attempt to cut costs, such as enacting a hiring freeze. However, any such efforts
would only leave the PTO less able to process the substantial (and likely growing) number of
examinations demanded of the Agency to which the Agency is obligated to respond.
61. See Wasserman, supra note 16, at 412–14 & n.129 (noting that the PTO stands to earn
more money by granting patents in technologies with high renewal rates and patents associated
with large entities).
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characteristics that bear on the PTO’s ability to earn increased
revenue by issuing additional patents of certain types: (1) the rate of
renewal or maintenance among patents of certain types and (2) the
entity size (large vs. small) of the relevant patent applicant.62
The latter characteristic, entity size, is immediately discernible
to the PTO upon the filing of a patent application. Patent examiners,
who are charged with reviewing applications and making a decision on
the patentability of the invention, know the entity size of the patent
applicant.63 Because small entities pay half the examination, issue,
and maintenance fees of large entities, entity size has a significant
impact on the magnitude of the Agency’s fee stream. In contrast,
maintenance rates are not readily apparent to the Agency upon the
filing of a patent application. However, the PTO may assess the
likelihood that a given patent will ultimately pay renewal fees by
using relevant historical data on maintenance rates associated with
patents within the same technology category of the application. The
PTO may assign these categorical likelihoods using a relatively coarse
classification of technology types (e.g., chemical applications, electrical
device applications, etc.) or, perhaps, using the more fine-grained,
internal classification system that the PTO uses to instruct its
examination search process.64 Finally, it should be noted that unlike
entity size, patent class and technology types do not cause the
maintenance fees paid by patent applicants to vary.
While this study is not designed to explore the mechanism by
which additional patents are granted, we believe there are at least two

62. See id. at 412 n.129 (noting that because small entities pay half the amount of issue
and renewal fees as large entities, the PTO stands to make twice as much fee revenue by
granting a patent to a large relative to a small entity); id. at 412–14 (noting that because
patentees in certain technological sectors are more likely to renew their patents than other
technological sectors, the PTO stands to earn more fee revenue by granting a patent associated
with a technology that has a high renewal rate relative to a patent associated with a technology
that has a low renewal rate).
63. This information is included in the patent application documents provided to patent
examiners. Patent applications are not sorted by large and small entities. Applications for the
most part are randomly assigned to patent examiners that have the technological expertise to
examine the application. See Lemley & Sampat, supra note 5, at 818.
64. Every patent application that is filed with the PTO is assigned a classification before it
enters examination. The Agency utilizes classifications to funnel patent applications to
examiners with the prerequisite scientific knowledge to review the application. With respect to
the examination complexity factor, the PTO is well suited to differentiate across patent
applicants using this fine-grained internal classification system (as opposed to a broader
technological classification), given that the complexity measures used to allocate examination
hours (and thus examiner pay) are determined in the first instance with reference to the
applicant’s patent class.
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different channels for favoring certain patent types.65 The first is a
top-down channel, wherein senior-level officials who are responsive to
the post-allowance fee differential instruct examiners to preferentially
grant patents filed by large entities and high renewal-rate
technologies relative to others. The PTO’s ability to extend such
categorical or technology-specific instructions to examiners is
facilitated by the Agency’s organizational structure, which is itself
largely based on technological divisions.66 The second is an examinerfocused channel, whereby patent examiners themselves, without
prompting from supervisors, respond to the profitability implications
of varying renewal rates and entity size.67 Patent examiners,
especially senior examiners, may internalize the negative impact of
budgetary shortfalls to the Agency.68 Thus, patent examiners may
possess sufficient motivation by themselves to preferentially grant
patents filed by large entities and high renewal-rate technologies
relative to others when the PTO’s fee collections are low.
The rest of this Part proceeds by considering the manner in
which each of the two above-mentioned characteristics (i.e., renewal
rates and entity size) bears on the profitability of the PTO’s marginal
65. In future work we plan to explore this mechanism in more depth.
66. Once a patent application has been assigned a technology classification, it is then,
based on its class number, routed to an Art Unit, where it eventually will be examined by a
patent examiner. Lemley & Sampat, supra note 5, at 818. Art Units may be assigned patent
applications from one class, a portion of a class, or from several classes involving closely related
technology. See Patent Classification: Classes Arranged by Art Unit, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/classification/art/index.jsp (last modified Oct. 3,
2012). Art Units are likewise aggregated into larger parcels that contain anywhere from five to
fifteen Art Units and are eventually aggregated into one of nine technology centers. Patent
Technology Centers, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/about/contacts/
phone_directory/pat_tech/index.jsp (last modified Feb. 17, 2010) (listing the nine patent
technology centers within the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office). This hierarchical structure
creates a situation in which patents of a particular PTO class are consistently examined by a
targeted population of examiners (i.e., applications within a particular class are not randomly
assigned among a large number of Art Units; rather, they are assigned to one or a few Art
Units). This consistency makes it easier for top-level officials within the Agency to coordinate
with and direct examiners to grant more patents in one technology category (for example, one
with a higher renewal rate) relative to another category (for example, one with a lower renewal
rate).
67. Patent examiners may be consciously or subconsciously responding to profit variations
of patents.
68. Alternatively, patent examiners may be responding to low fee collections by favoring
certain types of patents over others because they recognize the negative impact of budgetary
shortfalls to their daily life (e.g., an elimination of overtime). Examiners will most likely respond
to the differential in fee collections when fees are low, as overtime is most likely to be eliminated
when the PTO’s financial health is in jeopardy. If this is the dominate mechanism, then low-level
officials would be acting in a self-interested manner, but the aggregate result would mimic a
benevolent-but-resource-constrained agency.
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granting decisions. We then set forth various testable hypotheses
regarding how the Agency will alter its granting decisions in response
to these marginal incentives.69
A. Renewal Rates
Once a patent is issued it does not automatically remain in
force for the duration of its twenty-year patent term.70 The patentee
must take the affirmative step of paying renewal or maintenance fees
at three-and-a-half, seven-and-a-half, and eleven-and-a-half years
from the date at which the patent issued to assure the patent’s
enforceability (referred to as four-year, eight-year, and twelve-year
maintenance fees in the empirical analysis discussed below). If a
patentee fails to pay any of these fees, the invention enters the public
domain.71 Renewal fees currently account for nearly 30% of the PTO’s
patent budget, while the cost to the Agency to maintain a patent is
negligible. Thus, such fees are almost exclusively utilized to subsidize
other agency activity.
However, not every patent grant generates equal renewal-fee
revenue. While maintenance fees do not vary across technology
classifications, patentees elect to pay these fees at dramatically
different rates across such classifications.72 Accordingly, the PTO
stands to gain more financially by granting patents in technologies
that are likely to be renewed at a higher rate relative to those likely to
be renewed a lower rate.73 Of course, just because the PTO has this
financial incentive does not necessarily mean the Agency will act on it.
The latter depends, in part, on the Agency’s primary objectives and its
needs. The rest of this Section proposes that both a self-interested and
a benevolent-but-resource-constrained PTO will grant more patents in
69. Importantly, besides the harms associated with a bias toward granting patents, any
distortions in the PTO’s granting patterns across technological fields and entity size may
likewise distort the allocation of innovation resources in society.
70. This is true only for patents that mature from patent applications filed on or after
December 12, 1980. 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2006) (listing the duration of a patent’s effectiveness and
the corresponding fees that the Director may charge “for maintaining in force all patents based
on applications filed on or after December 12, 1980”). This date introduced renewal or
maintenance fees to the U.S. patent system. Thus, patent applications filed before December 12,
1980, were automatically enforceable until the end of their patent term. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b).
71. The late payment of any maintenance fee may be accepted if the delay in payment is
shown to have been “unavoidable.” 35 U.S.C. § 41(c)(1).
72. Renewal-rate differentials hold across technologies both when categorizing technology
in terms of the PTO’s own classification system and when using more coarsely defined systems.
See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
73. Wasserman, supra note 16, at 412.
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technology categories with high renewal rates relative to patents in
categories with low renewal rates, albeit for different reasons.
1. The Self-Interested, Budget-Maximizing PTO
Given that the PTO is seeking to maximize its budget, how will
this differential-renewal-fee incentive affect its granting behavior? At
first glance it might not affect it at all. A budget-maximizing PTO will
instruct examiners to grant every patent, as the Agency stands to
profit on each marginal grant from the possibility of the ensuing
maintenance fees, whether the probability of collecting such fees is low
or high.74 Of course, a self-interested PTO may not adopt such a
drastic practice for several reasons, including fear of congressional
retribution.75 To the extent the PTO believes it can skirt detection,
and hence punishment, by adopting a less extreme bias toward
allowing patents, then even a self-interested PTO may distort its
granting behavior in response to the differential in profits arising from
technology-wide variations in renewal rates. A self-interested agency
can maximize the fees it stands to collect for a given distortionary bias
by focusing this overpatenting tendency on technology categories
where it stands to profit the most by granting additional patents—
technology categories with high renewal rates.
Hypothesis 1: Following the adoption of a near fully user-feefunded system, a self-interested PTO will grant patents at an
incrementally higher rate for patents within technology categories that
generally have high maintenance rates relative to patents within
categories that generally have low maintenance rates.
2. The Benevolent-but-Resourced-Constrained PTO
As discussed in the previous Part, even a benevolent PTO may
bias examiners toward granting patents in an effort to reestablish
74. Examination costs are irrelevant for this marginal profitability assessment given that
the PTO must examine those applications that are filed and that such examination costs will
have already been incurred at the time the PTO makes it granting decision.
75. Administrative law scholars have long noted that Congress exerts substantial influence
over agencies that are funded through discretionary spending, meaning that Congress evaluates
their budgetary needs annually during the appropriations cycle. See, e.g., RICHARD F. FENNO,
JR., THE POWER OF THE PURSE: APPROPRIATIONS POLITICS IN CONGRESS 291 (1966) (“Once the
[Appropriations] Committee’s ability to hurt it is recognized, the most obvious way for the agency
to ensure a favorable kind of relationship with the Committee is simply to do . . . what the
Committee tells it to do.”); Bruce Yandle, Regulators, Legislators and Budget Manipulation, 56
PUB. CHOICE 167, 178 (1988) (“Budget manipulation is the most effective sanction available to
Congress.”).
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financial sustainability. However, rather than increase patenting
across the board, a benevolent PTO in need of additional funds may
also generally instruct examiners to grant relatively more patents in
technologies with high renewal rates than patents in technologies
with low renewal rates.76 Under the assumption of benevolence, the
PTO will likely wish to limit the degree to which it distorts its
granting decisions away from what is otherwise optimal policy. As a
result, a benevolent-but-resource-constrained PTO that is attempting
to reach a revenue goal would prefer to satisfy this target by granting
a few extra patents in technology categories with respect to which it
will profit the most—i.e., those with high maintenance rates—rather
than a larger number of extra patents in technology categories with
respect to which it will profit the least—i.e., those with low
maintenance rates.77
Hypothesis 2: Following the adoption of a near fully user-feefunded system and during times at which a benevolent PTO is resource
constrained, the PTO will grant patents at an incrementally higher
rate for patents within technology categories that generally have high
maintenance rates relative to patents within categories that generally
have low maintenance rates.

76. This analysis, of course, assumes that the PTO knows it will take at least three-and-ahalf years to generate any of these additional revenues. Accordingly, the Agency must anticipate
that its resource constraints will likely be binding over at least a moderately long period of time.
Moreover, this analysis also assumes that the current PTO management structure is sufficiently
forward thinking, even in light of the limited tenure of PTO directors. The director of the PTO is
nominated by the President and approved by the Senate, and thus the director of the PTO
changes when the administration in the White House changes. See 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(1) (2006).
Nonetheless, other high-level administrators offer significant continuity to the Agency, as these
bureaucrats tend to have long tenures at the Agency. See § 3. For example, Commissioner Stoll,
who was commissioner for patents, retired from the PTO at the end of 2011 after twenty-nine
years of service to the Agency. Press Release, 11-62, Commissioner for Patents Robert Stoll to
Retire from Government Service After 29 Years at the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (Nov. 2, 2011).
77. Assume that a benevolent PTO is seeking to generate an additional $6,800 in fee
revenue at a future date. In order to accomplish this goal, the Agency is considering granting
additional patents either in a class that has a 90% renewal rate or a class that has a 10%
renewal rate. The maintenance-fee income generated, on average, from granting an additional
patent in each of these classes is $6,813 in the former and only $757 in the latter. Thus, in order
to meets its revenue target, the PTO can either grant one additional patent in the 90% renewal
patent class or nine additional patents in the 10% renewal-rate class. This calculation assumes
the same renewal rate across all three stages of renewal fees. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.20(e)–(g) (2012)
(listing renewal fees for three-and-a-half, seven-and-a-half, and eleven-and-a-half years from the
date the patent issues of $980, $2,480, and $4,110 respectively).
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B. Entity Size
Small-entity status allows independent inventors, small
businesses, and nonprofit organizations to pay 50% reduced patent
fees.78 As a result, the PTO stands to earn twice the amount of postallowance fees (i.e., issuance and renewal fees) by granting a patent
filed by a large entity than by granting a patent filed by a small
entity.79 Of course, the manner in which the PTO responds to this
marginal incentive will likely depend on its baseline objectives. The
rest of this Section outlines the reasons for why both a self-interested
and a benevolent-but-resource-constrained PTO are likely to grant
more patents with large-entity designations relative to patents with
small-entity designations.
1. The Self-Interested, Budget-Maximizing PTO
Similar to the maintenance-rate factor, a self-interested PTO
will be incentivized to always grant patents. Although the Agency
stands to earn half as much fee revenue by granting a small-entity
patent versus a large-entity patent, the PTO will still collect some fee
revenue by granting the former. As discussed above, the Agency is
unlikely to adopt such an extreme practice. However, if a selfinterested PTO believes it can avert detection and hence punishment
by adopting a less extreme bias toward allowing patents, then the
Agency will likely focus this expansionary pressure where it stands to
earn the biggest returns—large entities. As a result, a self-interested
PTO will grant relatively more patents filed by large relative to small
entities.
Hypothesis 3: Following the adoption of a near fully user-feefunded system, a self-interested PTO will grant patents at an
incrementally higher rate to patent applicants with large-entity status,
relative to those with small-entity status.
2. The Benevolent-but-Resourced-Constrained PTO
A benevolent PTO that is resource constrained will grant more
patents in an effort to increase revenue. However, desiring to
minimize deviations from optimal patent policy, the PTO is likely to
78. 35 U.S.C. § 41(h). A “small” entity is defined by the PTO as individuals, nonprofit
corporations, or corporations that qualify as small businesses under the Small Business Act. 37
C.F.R. § 1.27(a)(1)–(3) (2012).
79. Wasserman, supra note 16, at 412 n.129.

2b. FrakesWasserman_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

92

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1/18/2013 11:57 AM

[Vol. 66:1:67

focus its granting bias on those patents where it stands to profit the
most by issuing an additional patent. Accordingly, when a benevolent
PTO is bound by financial constraints, it will grant more patents to
applicants with large-entity status, relative to those with small-entity
status.
Hypothesis 4: Following the adoption of a near fully user-feefunded system and during times at which a benevolent PTO is resource
constrained, the PTO will grant patents at an incrementally higher
rate to patent applicants with large-entity status, relative to those with
small-entity status.
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data Sources and Key Variables
In order to investigate the manner in which the PTO responds
to the incentives posed by its fee structure, it is necessary to acquire
data on the PTO’s granting patterns covering a sufficiently long period
of time and covering a broad array of patent types. For these purposes,
we filed Freedom of Information Act requests to the PTO and obtained
a previously unavailable, comprehensive annual data set on PTO
patent-processing outcomes for every utility patent application that
was received at the PTO over the sample period.80 More specifically,
the patent-processing data contains annual patent filings, allowances,
and disposals, disaggregated by patent class and entity size.81 The
80. For the purposes of this empirical analysis, we focus only on utility patents, especially
considering that maintenance fees do not apply to design or plant patents. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.20
(2012).
81. In the data received by the PTO, disposals include patent applications that have been
allowed and abandoned. Abandoned patent applications include patent applications that have
been rejected and patent applications that have been abandoned for business reasons. Curiously,
a patent applicant can elect to “restart” the patent examination process of an application that
has been rejected by filing a request for continued examination (“RCE”) or by filing a
continuation application. By restarting the patent examination process, a “finally rejected”
patent application receives continued examination by the PTO. The PTO data includes a finally
rejected patent application if an applicant subsequently files a continuation application in its
disposals. In contrast, the data does not include a finally rejected patent application if an
applicant subsequently files an RCE in its disposals. Most likely, this difference in accounting
results from the fact that a patent applicant who files a continuation application files an entirely
new application, whereas a patent applicant who files an RCE is requesting continued
prosecution of the existing application. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of
Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 68 n.14 (2004). As a result, we control for RCE filings
to alleviate concerns that some patent types are better able to secure ultimate allowances
through greater usage of RCEs. See infra Section IV.E and Appendix B.
In addition, the PTO appears to have little to no financial incentive to encourage the filing of
continuations. The fees for examining an RCE are set below the examining fees for a new
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sample collected spans the time period from 1983 to 2010. On average,
over our sample period, 258,883 patent applications were filed each
year, 132,181 patents were allowed each year, and 189,660 patent
applications were disposed of each year. Previous investigations on the
PTO’s granting patterns have utilized an alternate source that allows
for the calculation of PTO grant rates across patent types from only
2001 onwards.82 Our data allows for the calculation of annual PTO
grant rates across patent types spanning the period of 1983 to the
present, which in turn makes possible the exploration of the influence
of the 1991 fee reform on the PTO’s granting behavior.
More specifically, we use these data to calculate patent grant
rates specific to given technology-year combinations (e.g., for genetic
patents in 1995) and specific to given technology-year–entity-size
combinations. Consistent with the PTO’s own representation of its
granting practices, we calculate grant rates as the number of patents
granted by the PTO divided by the number of patent applications
disposed of by the PTO.83 We categorize technology groups in various
ways throughout this analysis. In our primary specifications, we
utilize the technological subcategories (delineating thirty-seven
different technology groups) specified by Bronwyn Hall, Adam Jaffe,
and Manuel Trajtenberg and developed for the Patent Data Project of
the National Bureau of Economic Research.84
application, and the fees for examining a continuation application are the same as a new
application. 37 C.F.R. § 1.17(e) (2012) (showing that in the fiscal year of 2010 the examination
fees for an RCE were $810 for a large entity and $405 for a small entity). While the PTO
acknowledges that the cost of examining a continuing application are, on average, less than the
costs of examining an original application, the savings do not reach the amount required to align
fees with costs. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DETAILED APPENDICES: PATENT FEE
PROPOSAL 1, 61 (2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/fee_setting__ppac_hearing_appendices_7feb12.pdf (showing that the PTO estimates the historical cost of
examining RCE is approximately $1700); see also Wasserman, supra note 16, at 409–10 (noting
that “the mismatch in examination fees and examination costs for a patent application are likely
to increase with each iteration through the examination system”).
82. See, e.g., Lemley & Sampat, supra note 11, at 187–89.
83. See, e.g., EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, KOREAN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY OFFICE & U. S. PATENT OFFICE, FOUR OFFICE STATISTICS REPORT 2010 (2010),
available at http://www.trilateral.net/statistics/tsr/fosr2010/annex2.pdf. Table A2 of Appendix B
demonstrates the robustness of the empirical results to the use of alternative grant-rate
constructions. See also supra note 81 (describing the data received by the PTO).
84. Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The NBER Patent-Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights, and
Methodological Tools, in PATENTS, CITATIONS, & INNOVATIONS: A WINDOW ON THE KNOWLEDGE
ECONOMY 403, 434–37 (Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg eds., 2002). The PTO classifies
patents into nearly five hundred different technology classes. This classification scheme,
however, changes somewhat over time as new classes are added or as others are divided. These
compositional changes (particularly divisions) potentially complicate an empirical analysis that
tracks within-category changes in PTO behavior over time. For these reasons (and to facilitate a
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We then merge these data on grant rates with data on
technology-specific maintenance rates, which capture the likelihoods
that patents issuing within the relevant category will be renewed by
the patentee at the respective four-year, eight-year, and twelve-year
marks following their issuance.85 The primary empirical specifications
estimated below focus on differentiating across technology categories
based on the likelihood of renewing patents at the four-year mark;
however the empirical results are robust to alternative approaches
that focus on eight-year or twelve-year rates or on some combination
of the three rates, as demonstrated by Table A2 in Appendix B.
Appendix A provides further details on the construction of the
estimation sample and of the relevant variables employed in the
empirical analysis.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables
used in the regression analysis. The PTO has granted or allowed
roughly 70% of the total patents that it has disposed of over the
sample period.86 Applications from inventors with small-entity status
represent roughly 29% of the total number of application filings.
Roughly 85% of those patents eligible for renewal at the four-year
mark, in fact, renewed their patents. In Appendix A, we provide a
breakdown of the maintenance rates and incidence of small entities
for each technology category. This breakdown evidences meaningful
variation in renewal rates across categories, providing support not
only for the methodological framework discussed below, which relies
more manageable regression framework), in our preferred specifications we group patents into
the relatively coarser technology classification system set forth by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg.
As demonstrated by Table A2 of Appendix B, however, the results are nearly identical when
using regression specifications based on the PTO classifications themselves. In any event, this
approach may constitute a more appropriate specification to the extent that the PTO elects to
differentiate its granting practices (as hypothesized) at a relatively coarser level. Moreover, if the
PTO does indeed differentiate all the way to the PTO classification level, any such differential
response should still be observable at the more aggregated level assuming some amount of
correlation of profitability characteristics (e.g., maintenance rates) across PTO classes within
National Bureau of Economic Research (“NBER”) subcategories, as is borne out by the data.
85. For each patent issued following September 1, 1981, the PTO collects detailed log data
on all maintenance events for the relevant patent, including, for example, the payment of its
four-year renewal fee or the termination of the patent for the failure to pay its due four-year
renewal fee. See Patent Maintenance Fees (.zip) and Description Files (.txt) (September 1, 1981 –
Present), U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://eipweb.uspto.gov/MaintFeeEvents (last modified
Oct. 25, 2012) (providing publically available data).
86. As the data received by the PTO includes a finally rejected patent application if an
applicant subsequently files a continuation application as a disposal, our grant rates do not
represent the chances that an originally filed application will issue. Importantly, our analysis
does not depend on this calculation, as we are interested in studying the influence of the PTO’s
fee structure on its granting behavior, not the chances an originally filed application will be
allowed.
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upon this variation, but also in the predicted sensitivity of PTO grant
rates to its fee structure.87
TABLE 1: MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF SELECTED VARIABLES
(1)
Panel A. Averaged Across Patent Category / Year Combinations
Patent Grant Rate (%, Allowances / Disposals)

70.21
(13.71)

Patent Allowances (1,000’s)

6.75
(5.09)

Four-Year Maintenance Rate (%)

84.74
(5.09)

Eight-Year Maintenance Rate (%)

63.48
(8.82)

Twelve-Year Maintenance Rate (%)

43.70
(8.94)

Small-Entity Status Rate (%, Small-Entity
Applications / Total Applications)

28.52
(15.28)

Panel B. Aggregate PTO Measures, Averaged Across Years
Fee-Diversion Policy (% Incidence)

50.00
(50.92)

Sustainability Score

0.40
(0.11)

Standard deviations are in parentheses. Descriptive statistics are from a sample of
1,058 technology category / year cells from 1983 to 2010 in Panel A and from a sample
of twenty-eight years in Panel B. The statistics presented in Panel A are weighted by
the relevant number of patent disposals associated with each category-year cell, while
those in Panel B are unweighted. The definition of each variable is set forth in greater
detail in Appendix A.

87. See infra Table A1 in Appendix A (demonstrating the average maintenance rates across
each of the thirty-seven technological categories considered in this empirical analysis). Averaging
over the entire sample period, four-year maintenance rates, for instance, span from roughly
69.5% at the lowest to 93.4% at the highest.
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Likewise, grant rates demonstrate a meaningful level of
variation across technology categories and across years, with a
standard deviation of 13.7 relative to its mean of 70.2 (with over 30%
of this variation reflecting changes in grant rates within patent
categories over time).88 How much of this variation can be explained
by the imposition of the PTO’s current fee structure and by variations
in the PTO’s financial strength? We now turn to an explanation of the
methodological approach undertaken to investigate these questions.
B. Methodology
1. Difference-in-Difference Analysis
In order to statistically tease out the relationship between the
PTO’s fee structure and its grant rates, we embrace the existence of a
“natural experiment” made possible by the Omnibus Reconciliation
Act of 1990, which became effective in 1991. This reform resulted in a
roughly 70% increase in the fees assessed by the PTO and, for the first
time, left the PTO essentially fully funded by user fees.89 By observing
the PTO’s granting practices before and after a reform that put into
place its current funding structure, we hope to gain an understanding
of how this structure affects the foremost decision with which the
Agency is tasked: whether or not to grant a patent.
Of course, simply observing the change in overall PTO grant
rates before and after this reform in an effort to explore the impact of
the reform would be highly problematic. Grant rates are almost
certain to change over time for reasons unrelated to the financial
incentives facing the PTO—e.g., changes in the quality of underlying
applications. Indeed, the predictions set forth in Part II do not dictate
that the PTO’s grant rates will, in an absolute sense, clearly increase
subsequent to the fee reform and during times of strongly binding
financial constraints. Rather, the theory predicts that the PTO’s grant
rates will be higher than they otherwise would be absent the presence

88. It is technically this within-class variation in grant rates over time that is the target of
our regression analysis. By including what are called category “fixed effects” we allow for
completely fixed differences in grant rates over time across the categories. We ask whether grant
rates increase following the 1991 reform within our treatment categories, subtracting out the
corresponding within-category changes in grant rates for the control categories (e.g., low
maintenance rate categories) in order to isolate the effect of the fee reform.
89. Prior to this time, the PTO met roughly half of its obligations through the collection of
user fees. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1992, at 53 tbl.2
(1993).
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of the fee reform and/or the financial constraints.90 The possibility that
other factors may drive grant rates leaves it difficult statistically to
disentangle the marginal influence of the fee-structure reform from
the impact of changes in these other factors over time (absent
observable data on all such other factors). To surmount this problem,
we utilize a “difference-in-difference” estimation approach
(implemented via regression analysis) that is commonly employed by
policy evaluation studies in the economics and law and economics
literatures.
The essential premise behind the difference-in-difference
approach is to observe how grant rates change before and after the
1991 reform for a set of patents with respect to which the PTO is not
likely to exhibit an expansionary responsiveness between grant rates
and fee structure (e.g., those with low maintenance rates). To the
extent that the grant rates associated with patents of this latter type
are likewise impacted by those unobservable drivers of PTO behavior,
one can view this set of patents as a “control” group. As such, one can
effectively use the change in grant rates around the 1991 fee reform
for this control group as an estimate for the influence of the change
over time in these unobservable drivers. Thereafter, one can subtract
this estimate from the corresponding estimate of the change in grant
rates before and after the 1991 reform on the set of patents for which
one would expect a responsiveness between grant rates and fee
structure—i.e., the treatment group. This calculation should provide
us with the desired disentangling of factors and thus leave us with an
unbiased estimate of the true impact of the reform itself on PTO
granting practices.
To execute this empirical approach and to form the necessary
treatment and control groups, we draw on the theoretical predictions
from Part II regarding which types of patents are associated with
grant rates that are more or less likely to be sensitive to fee structure.
Embracing each of the predictions set forth in Part II, we test for
various differential responses to the 1991 reform across different types
of patents—e.g., across large and small entities. Under the

90. For instance, if other, unrelated factors are driving a downward trend in PTO grant
rates, the theory predicts that the influence of fees and/or financial constraints may cause that
trend to be less severe than it otherwise would be. Moreover, even if, in absolute terms, grant
rates are not rising over time, it may still be the case that the marginal increase in patent grant
rates that otherwise does ensue from these fee influences could be detrimental to innovation
policy. After all, such influences could be disrupting what is otherwise a rational and optimal
downward trend in granting policies. The focus of this Article is on that marginal, fee-related
distortion itself.
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fundamental assumption that, absent the reform, each patent type
would have continued along the same trajectory (not necessarily at the
same level, though), this exercise allows us to evaluate the general
motivating question of this Article: does the PTO distort its granting
practices in an expansionary manner in response to its fee-based
incentives?
It is worth emphasizing that this approach accounts for the
possibility of completely fixed differences in grant rates across patent
types—i.e., inherent differences across types that are present across
all sample years. After all, to use entity size as an example, our
analysis is not simply comparing large- and small-entity grant rates.
Rather, we are comparing how the change in large-entity grant rates
before and after 1991 compares to the corresponding change in smallentity grant rates before and after 1991. As such, by focusing on this
difference-in-difference calculation, we allow for the possibility that
there is something fundamentally unique about the granting
likelihoods facing large entities relative to small entities (i.e., the
possibility that large entities garner a higher grant rate than small
entities because the former has access to higher-quality attorneys or
because the former has better internal screening mechanisms
regarding the patentability of their inventions). It is also worth
emphasizing that this empirical exercise does not rule out the
possibility of other Agency-level and examiner-level biases in behavior
(e.g., examiner biases ensuing from their compensation structure).
Rather, the design is simply meant to isolate the particular bias
stemming from the Agency’s fee structure.
In reality, the empirical specifications that we estimate below
are a bit richer than the simple difference-in-difference description set
forth above, though that description does capture its key intuitions. In
Appendix A we provide more details regarding the precise empirical
specifications that we estimate. For instance, rather than forming one
treatment group and one control group, many of our empirical
approaches consider a continuum of patent types (e.g., differentiating
technology categories based on a measure of their four-year
maintenance rates) and then observe how the PTO’s practices respond
to the 1991 reform as we move along this continuum.91

91. While numerous examples exist, the primary empirical precedent that we follow in this
Article is Daron Acemoglu and Amy Finkelstein’s investigation into the differential change in the
capital-labor ratio of hospitals following the national adoption of the Medicare Prospective
Payment System (PPS) in 1984, where hospitals are differentiated (and theorized to respond
differently to the adoption of PPS) based on their pre-reform share of Medicare patient days.
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Of course, while the difference-in-difference approach holds the
promise of isolating the marginal effect of the PTO’s fee structure on
its grant rates, it does rely on various assumptions and thus carries
various caveats. For instance, if those separate patent types that are
predicted to be responsive and nonresponsive, respectively, to the
patent fee structure already happen to be on divergent trends in their
granting patterns prior to the fee reform, then the basic difference-indifference results may be picking up the influence of these preexisting
trends, as opposed to the influence of the reform itself. Fortunately,
we will be able to look for various markers of this potentially
confounding story, as will be discussed in the results section below.
More generally, in a series of so-called “specification checks,” we
challenge the various assumptions underlying the baseline empirical
approaches and demonstrate the flexibility and the robustness of the
findings to a range of alternative approaches.
2. Financial-Sustainability Analysis
Our regression analysis exploits sources of variations beyond
that of mere time (before and after 1991) and patent type (e.g., large
vs. small entity). Integral to our empirical analysis is also the
consideration of variations over time in the degree to which the PTO is
bound by its financial constraints and likely to be in need of additional
sources of revenue. As predicted in Part I, under the assumption of
benevolence, the PTO may only be expected to respond to fee
incentives by granting differentially across patent types during times
in which such constraints are binding. In order to test this prediction,
we modify the basic regression approach discussed above and
effectively explore whether the primary difference-in-difference
finding is itself likely to emerge to a stronger degree during times in
which markers indicative of PTO revenue need are more prevalent.
For these purposes, we draw upon the theory set forth in Part I,
whereby we predicted that the PTO would be more likely to trigger its
sustainability constraint upon a change in various factors, including
an increase in its backlog, a decrease in its annual renewal-fee
collections, an increase in the average complexity of its examinations,
and a decrease in the proportion of large-entity patentees. Each such
development would disrupt any financial balance reached and
decrease the proportion of incoming fees to outgoing costs.

Daron Acemoglu & Amy Finkelstein, Input and Technology Choices in Regulated Industries:
Evidence from the Health Care Sector, 116 J. POL. ECON. 837 (2008).
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In Table A8 of Appendix B, we estimate regressions that
explore how fluctuations over time in each of these separate factors
are associated with a differential grant rate across the delineated
patent types. Of course, in any given year, all of these factors are
changing at the same time, even though the PTO is only subject to a
single sustainability constraint. In other words, in a given year, the
PTO may experience an X% increase in its backlog, which will leave it
more likely to face break-even concerns, along with a Y% increase in
aggregate renewal rates, which will leave it less likely to face such
concerns. These separate regressions alone leave us unable to
determine how to weigh the respective influences of each such
development upon the PTO’s aggregate financial strength and thus
upon its ultimate decisionmaking. Therefore, in our primary approach
to testing this sustainability prediction, which we undertake in Part
IV below, we combine these factors into a composite sustainability
measure. This “sustainability score” is constructed so as to capture the
impact of these factors on the PTO’s financial balance in a manner
consistent with the empirically relevant influence of each such factor.
To this end, we use actual data on the annual fluctuations in the
above factors (e.g., annual maintenance rates, backlog levels, etc.),
along with information on the parameters of the PTO’s fee schedule, to
simulate an annual measure equal to the ratio between (1) the
issuance and post-issuance fees generated by the existing stock of
patents at a given point in time and (2) the net costs associated with
the examinations demanded of the PTO at that time.92 Appendix A
provides further specifics regarding this calculation. A higher
simulated sustainability score is suggestive of fewer financial
pressures facing the PTO and thus less need of additional funds.
In calculating this sustainability metric, we proxy the
examination demand facing the PTO in a given year by the PTO’s
backlog of patent examinations at that time.93 Of course, the PTO does
92. This calculation also draws upon information on the history of patent issuances over
time, which bears, for instance, on the number of patents up for renewal during the given year.
In rough terms, multiplying these numbers by the annual renewal rates and by the associated
renewal fees allows us to estimate the amount of issuance and post-issuance fees that were made
available to the PTO during the given year. See infra Appendix A.
93. Using annual disposal counts to proxy for this demand is less preferred considering
that disposals are under the PTO’s control and could be seen as a reflection of the PTO’s
response to the demands it faces, as opposed to a reflection of the underlying, external cost
pressures being placed upon the PTO. In rough terms, we estimate the net costs associated with
all of the examinations demanded upon the PTO for a given year by multiplying the backlog by
the average costs of examination for that year, where this average is influenced by the
distribution of applications across the various examination complexity levels for that year (that
is, certain technologies are allocated more hours of examination and thus carry greater
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not need to examine its entire backlog each year. Nonetheless, it
might be reasonable to assume, especially considering the PTO’s own
rhetoric,94 that the Agency is nonetheless motivated by its mission to
increase disposals in the face of a large and growing backlog. As such,
the calculated sustainability score may provide a sense of the ease by
which the PTO may use its stream of incoming funds to satisfy the
substantial costs associated with all of those examinations presently
awaiting the PTO.
This exercise of exploring whether the PTO’s distortionary
practices are more pronounced during times of greater financial need
allows for an appropriate specification of the PTO’s predicted behavior
under the benevolent model. At the same time, this approach also
allows us to shed light on an ongoing debate in administrative law
regarding the nature of government employees: are PTO bureaucrats
acting in self-interest to universally expand the Agency’s budget or are
PTO bureaucrats acting with optimal innovation policy in mind,
though occasionally bound to distort the Agency’s behavior in pursuit
of required resources?
IV. RESULTS
The regression results presented in Table 2 illuminate and test
the key hypotheses presented in Part II above. Generally, these
hypotheses set forth that the PTO’s fee structure causes it to increase
the rate at which it grants patent types that generate higher back-end
fees relative to the rate at which it grants patent types that generate
lower back-end fees. This differential analysis sheds light on the
broader and more fundamental question motivating this paper: does
the PTO’s fee structure create a bias toward granting patents? We
begin in Panel A of Table 2 with an analysis of the PTO’s differential
examination costs, in which event average examination costs for a given year depend upon the
distribution of applications across technologies for that year). See infra Appendix A (offering
more detail). The sustainability score is not meant to reflect the actual profits accruing to the
PTO in a given year. Rather, it is meant to simulate how variations in the above-mentioned
factors (keeping all other factors fixed) affect its general profitability. That is, it provides a
meaningful and empirically relevant way of assessing the relative contributions to the PTO’s
financial position—i.e., its balance of incoming fees to outgoing costs—of each of these factors. If
the backlog happens to grow by 40% over a given year, while annual renewal rates increase by
5% over that year, this calculation allows for an appropriately greater emphasis to be placed
upon the backlog growth in assessing the PTO’s need for funds.
94. 2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 31, at 112 (stating that
the Inspector General’s top management challenges facing the PTO include “reducing the patent
application backlog”); 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 2, at 3 (“The
Agency continues to face operational challenges including . . . a large backlog.”).
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response to its fee structure across technology categories with varying
renewal rates.95
A. Difference-in-Difference Results: Renewal Rate Specifications
To recap, in Part II, we set forth the following testable
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Following the adoption of a near fully user-feefunded system, a self-interested PTO will grant patents at an
incrementally higher rate for patents within technology categories that
generally have high maintenance rates relative to patents within
categories that generally have low maintenance rates.
Hypothesis 2: Following the adoption of a near fully user-feefunded system and during times at which a benevolent PTO is resource
constrained, the PTO will grant patents at an incrementally higher
rate for patents within technology categories that generally have high
maintenance rates relative to patents within categories that generally
have low maintenance rates.
1. Primary Difference-in-Difference Results
The results presented in Panel A of Table 2 are consistent with
the general prediction that the PTO would, following the adoption of a
fully user-fee-funded system, grant at an incrementally higher rate to
patents within high-maintenance-rate categories relative to those
within low-maintenance-rate categories. The coefficient estimate
presented in Column 1 of Panel A captures the relationship between
the PTO’s grant rate and the interaction between being in the postreform period (“REFORM”) and being in a high-maintenance-rate
category (“MAINTAIN”). More specifically, the estimated figure of
58.96 suggests that the impact of the 1991 reform on the PTO grant
rate is fifty-nine percentage points higher (or roughly 84% higher) for
a patent category with a maintenance rate of 100% than it is for a
category with a 0% maintenance rate and likewise, 5.9 percentage

95. As discussed in Part III above, we classify patents into the thirty-seven technological
subcategories set forth by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, supra note 84. As demonstrated in Table
A2 of Appendix B, however, the pattern of results presented in Table 2 remains virtually
unchanged when we use alternative classification schemes, including the more fine-grained PTO
Classification System and the broader six-category-level system likewise introduced by Hall,
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg.
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points higher for a category with a maintenance rate of X% relative to
one with a rate of X-10%.96
This latter interpretation—i.e., the 5.9 percentage-point
differential—is perhaps a more meaningful description of the findings
considering that technology categories simply do not differ by 100
percentage points in their maintenance rates.97 The standard
deviation in four-year maintenance rates across technology categories
(unweighted) is roughly six percentage points, with a low maintenance
rate of roughly 62% (amusement devices) and a high of roughly 94%
(semiconductors).98 The underlying regression estimated in Panel A
explores the differential response to the 1991 reform along a linear
continuum of maintenance rates (by interacting the binary reform
variable with a continuous maintenance-rate measure). In Table A4 of
Appendix B, we relax the assumption of linearity and estimate a less
parametric specification that assigns technology categories
dichotomous (0/1) variables for being in different quartiles (e.g., top
96. We do not begin the sample period used in the maintenance-rate regressions until 1987.
By that time frame, both the PTO and the industry players will have acquired some experience
with the renewal payment process (maintenance fees originated with patents issued at least
after September 1981). This will allow us to evaluate how the steady-state experience of a PTO
with a renewal system in place responds to the 1991 fee reform. One might be concerned that the
reflection on the initial experience with maintenance fee payments led to certain immediate
behavioral changes that impacted relative grant rates across high-renewal and low-renewal
technology groups. For instance, consider a technology that is inclined to renew at a low rate.
Upon the imposition of the renewal system, one might expect that this industry would begin to
file applications at marginally lower rates, focusing this reduction on low-quality applications. A
response of this nature, in light of a more selective application pool, could lead to the observation
of a jump in grant rates for low renewal-rate technologies relative to high renewal-rate
technologies. This response may occur both during the initial imposition of the renewal system
and subsequently following the first experience with the renewal payment decision itself. In fact,
the data do suggest a pattern of this nature at both such times. The results of our analysis are
entirely robust to beginning our sample period in these earlier years. Of course, the 1991-feereform results are not likely to be severely jeopardized by this initial response to the
maintenance-fee-paying experience considering that this initial response ran counter to the
predicted response of the 1991 fee reform and could thus not serve as a competing explanation
for our primary results. In any event, to avoid this initial calibration and to more cleanly identify
the impact of the fee reform of interest, we elect to begin the sample in the period of time after
all parties have had the opportunity to experience at least a year or two of the renewal payment
process.
97. Panel A simply interprets the findings along such drastic extremes considering that the
MAINTAIN variable is defined in fractional terms (thus ranging from 0 to 1 in value) and that
coefficients of regressors are typically interpreted as the change in the dependent variable
associated with a one-point change in the regressor.
98.
This range is based on the preferred specification of the 4-year maintenance rates,
which are determined according to the average rates experienced across technology categories up
to 1990. See infra Appendix A. As such, this range differs slightly from that reported in Table
A1 (see infra Appendix A), which reports average maintenance rates experienced over all sample
years.
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25%, bottom 25%, etc.) of maintenance rates. We find a roughly 6.8
percentage-point differential grant-rate response to the 1991 reform
between technologies in the top and bottom quartiles of maintenance
rates.
TABLE 2. THE IMPACT OF PTO FEE REFORMS ON GRANT RATES:
PRIMARY DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Panel A. Differential Impact of Fee Reform Across Patent Categories with Varying
Maintenance Rates (unit of observation: Category / Year; dependent variable:
category-year-specific grant rate)
REFORM * MAINTAINi

58.96***
(19.16)

REFORM * MAINTAINi *

-

SUSTAINABILITY
REFORM * MAINTAINi *

170.41***

104.50***

125.78***

(47.16)

(28.63)

(45.67)

-290.18***

-

-

DIVERSION
Number of observations

-

(92.37)

887

887

-77.68
(126.20)

-70.29***

-57.09**

(18.38)

(23.83)

887

887

Panel B. Differential Impact of Fee Reform Between Patents with Large- and SmallEntity Status (unit of observation: Category / Year / Entity Size; dependent variable:
category–year–entity-size–specific grant rate)
REFORM * LARGE

6.44***
(1.61)

REFORM * LARGEi *

-

SUSTAINABILITY
REFORM * LARGEi * DIVERSION

Number of observations

21.92***

12.20***

17.39***

(4.36)

(2.37)

(4.33)

-40.82***

-

(8.44)
-

1843

-

1843

-19.24**
(9.46)

-9.27***

-5.88***

(1.77)

(1.87)

1843

1843

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and are clustered to correct for autocorrelation within patent categories over time
(Panel A) and for autocorrelation within patent-category / entity-size combinations over time
(Panel B). All regressions include patent-category fixed effects and year fixed effects to control
for fixed differences in grant rates across patent categories and across years, respectively.
Regressions in Panel B include entity-size fixed effects as well. Regressions are weighted by the
number of disposals used to form each observation’s grant rate. Data on patent-processing
statistics and maintenance rates were obtained from the PTO.
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Under an assumption that the PTO’s granting patterns for
high-maintenance-rate categories would otherwise have trended in the
same manner as for low-maintenance-rate categories absent the
reform (though still allowing for inherently fixed differences in grant
rates across technologies), the estimated difference-in-difference
findings can be interpreted as an expansionary effect of the fee reform
itself and thus of the user-fee-funded fee structure imposed by the
reform. In other words, the above estimate can be treated as causal in
nature under an assumption that there are no unobservable “shocks”
to the PTO’s granting practices that are specific to high-maintenancerate categories in the post-1991 period. We relax, and further explore
the validity of, this assumption in various ways in Section D and
Appendix B below. For instance, among others things, we demonstrate
that the PTO had not already begun these differential granting
patterns during the period of time prior to the reform, a finding that
would have otherwise raised concerns that some unobservable factor
other than the reform is responsible for the findings.
Of course, observing the differential response to the fee reform
across technologies with different renewal rates does more than
simply allow us to tell a potentially causal story (under the above
assumptions). This differential response represents immediate policy
concerns in its own right. That is, by possibly inducing the PTO to
extend preferential treatment to some technologies over others, the
PTO’s fee structure may be undesirably distorting the allocation of
resources across different sectors of the economy.
2. Sustainability-Interaction Results
According to the theory set forth in Parts I and II, a selfinterested PTO aiming to either maximize its budget or its profits
would always be expected to act upon the incentives created by its fee
structure. On the other hand, our model suggests that a benevolent
PTO would only elect to grant additional patents in an effort to earn
extra revenues during periods of time in which it is likely to be
resource constrained. As such, to more completely test the predictions
of the benevolent-PTO model, we modify the empirical specifications
estimated in Column 1 to interact the primary difference-in-difference
variable with a metric (i.e., the sustainability score described in Part
III) capturing the likelihood that the PTO is on strong financial
ground.
The coefficient on this interaction variable—i.e., in Panel A of
Table 2, the REFORM * MAINTAIN * SUSTAINABILITY variable—
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provides us with an indication of whether the differential grant-rate
response to the 1991 reform between high- and low-maintenance-rate
categories is itself likely to be greater during periods of time in which
the PTO is subject to heightened financial sustainability concerns. A
greater differential response of this nature would be identified by the
estimation of a negative coefficient on this interaction variable
considering that the sustainability score is defined such that a higher
score entails a stronger financial position of the PTO. Consistent with
this prediction, we estimate that as the sustainability score increases
by 0.1 (or roughly a 25% improvement in the financial position of the
PTO), the differential response to the 1991 reform between a 100%
maintenance-rate category and a 0% maintenance-rate category is
itself expected to fall by roughly twenty-nine percentage points.
While Column 2 explores whether the differential response to
the fee reform is stronger during times of more financial stress, we
also estimate empirical specifications that de-emphasize the 1991
reform and that directly specify a difference-in-difference analysis
based only on variations over time in the PTO’s financial
sustainability score, focusing only on the post-1991-reform period.
That is, we also estimate specifications that test whether the PTO
begins to grant patents at an incrementally higher rate to highmaintenance-rate technologies relative to low-maintenance-rate
technologies as the PTO experiences a change in conditions that
leaves it more likely to face sustainability concerns. One, of course,
needs some variation in the PTO’s fee structure to statistically tease
out the impact of that structure. This alternative conceptualization of
the basic difference-in-difference design is premised on the idea that
we may gain a better understanding of the impact of the PTO’s fee
structure by exploring variations in the conditions under which the
PTO would even be sensitive to that structure in the first place.
We present results of this alternative specification of the
primary difference-in-difference approach in Table A6 of Appendix B.
The findings completely match those of Column 2 in suggesting that
the PTO is more likely to distort its behavior when it is in greater
need of funds. For instance, we estimate that, as the sustainability
score decreases by 0.1 (representing a 25% decline in the PTO’s
financial sustainability position), the PTO begins to grant patents at a
29.2 percentage-point higher rate for patents within a technology
category with a maintenance rate of 100% relative to patents within a
category with a 0% maintenance rate. This finding can likewise be
interpreted as an effect ensuing from the PTO’s fee structure under an
assumption that there are no unobservable shocks to the PTO’s grant
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rates for high-maintenance-rate technologies that coincide with
declines in the PTO’s financial health.
All told, it appears that the PTO is not universally seeking to
expand its revenues in response to the incentives created by its userfee-funded structure. Rather, it may tend to use its granting practices
as a revenue-generating tool only when necessary to sustain itself. We
demonstrate this finding more clearly and on a year-to-year basis in
Section D below in discussing the results of a dynamic difference-indifference regression. In addition to confirming the predictions of the
benevolent-but-constrained PTO model, these findings likewise shed
light on the initial and more fundamental question of whether the
PTO is indeed self-interested or benevolent in motivation, arguably
providing support for those theories that have challenged the
Niskanen model.99
Accordingly, the findings presented in Panel A of Table 2 do not
lend support to Hypothesis 1, in so far as they are generally
inconsistent with the characterization of the PTO as being a selfinterested, budget-maximizing agency. However, the findings are
consistent with Hypothesis 2 in suggesting the PTO’s fee structure
induces the Agency to grant at an incrementally higher rate to highrenewal-rate technologies.
B. Difference-in-Difference Results: Entity-Size Specifications
To recap, in Part II, we set forth the following testable
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3: Following the adoption of a near fully user-feefunded system, a self-interested PTO will grant patents at an
incrementally higher rate to patent applicants with large-entity status,
relative to those with small-entity status.
Hypothesis 4: Following the adoption of a near fully user-feefunded system and during times at which a benevolent PTO is resource
constrained, the PTO will grant patents at an incrementally higher
rate to patent applicants with large-entity status, relative to those with
small-entity status.
1. Primary Difference-in-Difference Results
Similar to the maintenance-rate results discussed above, the
results presented in Panel B of Table 2 are consistent with the

99.

See supra Section I.B.1.
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prediction that the PTO would respond to the adoption of a fully userfee-funded system by granting at an incrementally higher rate to
patent applicants with large-entity status, relative to those with
small-entity status.100 The coefficient estimate reported in Column 1 of
Panel B suggests that the 1991 fee reform is associated with a 6.4
percentage-point higher grant rate for large entities relative to small
entities. Considering a mean grant rate of 70% over the sample period,
this corresponds to a roughly 9% higher grant rate for large entities.101
As above, under an assumption that large and small entities would
have otherwise followed a similar trend over time absent the reform
(though, still allowing for completely fixed differences in granting
patterns between large and small entities), this finding is suggestive
of an effect of the reform itself and thus of a bias toward granting
additional patents induced by the Agency’s fee structure.
In finding that the 1991 reform is associated with a
preferential grant rate for large entities, which pay double the fees of
small entities, we provide general support for the contention that the
PTO’s fee structure induces a bias toward granting patents. As with
the maintenance-rate results, this differential response also raises
policy concerns of its own and suggests that the effect of extending
lower fees to small entities may be to undermine the very purpose of
that fee differential in the first instance—i.e., to foster innovation
among small firms and individual entrepreneurs.102

100. While this underlying regression considers differences in grant rates over time (before
and after 1991) and across entity sizes (large and small), it also includes technology-specific fixed
effects. See infra Appendix A (providing further discussion). By accounting for fixed and inherent
differences across technologies (and knowing grant rates at a level specific to given years, entity
sizes, and technologies), we can alleviate concerns that the estimated findings are attributable to
a scenario in which the incidence of large-entity patentees increases over time within technology
categories that happen to experience higher grant rates historically.
In late 1982, Congress, for the first time, set differential fees based on small- versus largeentity-size distinctions. Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-247, § 1, 96 Stat. 317. This discount
for small entities was eventually made permanent. Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-607, §
1(b)(2), 100 Stat. 3470 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 41(h) (2006)). Accordingly, we set 1986
as the beginning of the sample period for the small-entity regressions; however, the results
remain virtually unchanged when we begin the estimation sample in 1983.
101. See also infra Table A2 in Appendix B (finding virtually identical results for this entitysize interaction coefficient when we include controls for maintenance rates at the entity-size–
category-specific level, confirming that the estimated differential granting trend between large
and small entities following the 1991 reform is likely a result of the higher (i.e., double) fees
ensuing from the large-entity status and not a result of the possibility that large entities also
happen to maintain their patents at higher rates).
102. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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2. Sustainability-Interaction Results
Consistent with the maintenance-rate results, we likewise find
that as the sustainability score increases (representing an
improvement in the PTO’s financial status), the differential response
to the 1991 reform between large and small entities falls, as evidenced
by the negative estimate of the coefficient on the REFORM * LARGE *
SUSTAINABILITY interaction term presented in Column 2 of Panel
B. Again, this suggests that the PTO may not be universally
increasing its grant rates in order to maximize fee revenues. Rather, it
appears that the PTO distorts its behavior so as to increase grant
rates to large entities (which generate higher fees) to a greater degree
during times in which the PTO is in greater need of funds.103
Accordingly, as with the maintenance-rate findings, the results
presented in Panel B of Table 2 do not lend support to Hypothesis 3, in
so far as they are generally inconsistent with the characterization of
the PTO as being a self-interested, budget-maximizing agency.
However, the findings are consistent with Hypothesis 4 in suggesting
the PTO’s fee structure induces the Agency to grant at an
incrementally higher rate to high-renewal-rate technologies.
C. Interactions with Fee-Diversion Policy
As indicated in Part I above, between the years of 1991 and
2003, the PTO was subject to policies that effectively forced it to share
a portion of its anticipated fee collections with Congress, an event that
is often labeled as “fee diversion.” The practice of fee diversion and the
consequent division of anticipated collections with Congress may blunt
the incentives of the PTO to increase its grant rates in an effort to
generate greater revenues. Consider the year 2002, for instance. While
the PTO projected it would collect roughly $1.35 billion over that year,
Congress only authorized a budget of $1.05 billion.104 Accordingly,
Congress’s inclinations to limit the PTO’s funding availability in 2002,
in turn, may have likely left the PTO less inclined to push Congress

103. See also infra Table A6 in Appendix B (estimating an alternative difference-indifference specification that focuses only on the post-1991 period and simply explores whether
the PTO increases its grant rate to large entities relative to small entities during times in which
the PTO faces greater financial pressures—i.e., during times in which its sustainability score
falls). Again, the estimates of this exercise match those of the results presented in Column 2 of
Panel B, which interact the fee-reform-based difference-in-difference variable with the
sustainability score.
104. See supra note 28.
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for an even higher budget that year and thus less inclined to seek an
expansion in its grant rates to justify a higher budget.
Following 2004, on the other hand, Congress neither
automatically diverted a percentage of the fees collected (as it did
between 1991 and 1998) nor capped the PTO’s budget at an amount
less than its anticipated collections (as it did between 1999 and 2003).
Rather, the PTO’s spending authority was capped at its projected
revenue stream, thereby maintaining a possible incentive of the PTO
to seek an expanded grant rate during those years and a
correspondingly higher anticipated revenue amount. We test these
predictions in Column 3 of Table 2. Similar to the sustainabilityinteraction specifications, we explore whether the differential
response to the 1991 reform across different patent types is, in turn,
weaker during those years (i.e., 1991–2003) in which a stronger feediversion policy was in place. Consistent with these expectations, the
results presented in Column 3 suggest that during periods of a strong
fee-diversion policy relative to a weak one, there will be a smaller feeinduced divergence in PTO grant rates across varying maintenancerate categories and between large and small entities.105 While the
practice of fee diversion may be undesirable from a number of policy
perspectives, it may nonetheless blunt the grant-related distortions
that arise from the PTO’s user-fee-funded structure.
D. Dynamic Difference-in-Difference Regression Results
Our empirical specifications allow for completely fixed
differences in grant rates across years and patent categories (in
Panels A and B) and likewise across entity-size specifications (in
Panel B). However, a concern arises that the primary difference-indifference result is merely reflective of a preexisting differential
granting trend between, for instance, large and small entities, as
opposed to being attributable to an actual effect of the fee reform
itself. To help rule out this possibility, we estimate dynamic
difference-in-difference regressions, which modify the approaches
taken thus far to now interact the categorical distinctions in patent

105. In Column 4 of Table 2, we attempt to disentangle the fee-diversion and sustainability
stories by including both sets of interactions in the same regression, an exercise complicated by
the significant collinearity between these two factors. While the estimated coefficients of the
interaction terms fall in magnitude and precision, the findings remain suggestive that the
differential granting patterns induced across patent types by the 1991 reform are themselves
likely to vary both as a result of fee diversion and as a result of the PTO’s actual need for
additional funds.
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types with a set of dichotomous variables representing each year in
the sample (as opposed to simply a dichotomous variable for being in
the post-1991 period). We present the results of these dynamic
regressions in Figures 1 and 2. For each year of the sample, we report
the 95% confidence bands of the coefficient on the interaction between
that year and the differential grant rate of interest (e.g., between large
and small entities in Figure 2). The coefficient values are interpreted
with reference to 1991, where the differential grant rate across patent
types is normalized to zero in 1991. More simply, the results of this
dynamic exercise can be interpreted as the time trend in the
differential grant rates across technology categories with high and low
maintenance rates (Figure 1) and between large and small entities
(Figure 2), where these differential rates are scaled such that they
equal zero in 1991.

Figure 1. Dynamic Maintenance-Rate Regression Results
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Note: the bars represent 95% confidence intervals for the estimated
coefficients of a dynamic difference-in-difference regression specification that
interacts the category-specific maintenance-rate variable with indicator
variables representing each year in the 1987–2010 period. This collection of
estimated dynamic coefficients can be interpreted as a time trend in the
differential granting periods between patent categories with high
maintenance rates relative to low maintenance rates. This differential is
normalized at zero in 1991, representing the reference year. Each regression
includes category and year fixed effects. Patent-processing and maintenance
data are from the PTO.
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Figure 2. Dynamic Entity-Size Regression Results
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Note: the bars represent 95% confidence intervals for the estimated
coefficients of a dynamic difference-in-difference regression specification
(with a unit of observation at the category-year–entity-size level) that
interacts the large-entity-size status indicator with indicator variables
representing each year in the 1986–2010 period. This collection of estimated
dynamic coefficients can be interpreted as a time trend in the differential
granting periods between large and small entities. This differential is
normalized at zero in 1991, representing the reference year. Each regression
includes category and year fixed effects. Patent-processing and maintenance
data are from the PTO.

This dynamic approach allows us to explore the evolution over
time in the relevant differential granting patterns. As can be observed
in each of Figures 1 and 2, there appears to be no discernible trend in
the direction of the expected reform effect in the pre-1991 period,
easing any concerns that the main results in Table 2 are reflective of
preexisting differential trends likely attributable to factors other than
the reform.
Of course, there remains a concern that unobservable factors
emerging in the post-1991 period are responsible for the observed
patterns—e.g., unobserved “shocks” in the grant rates of highmaintenance-rate categories in the post-1991 period. We appease
these concerns in various ways in Appendix B. For instance, in Table
A3, we demonstrate the robustness of our results to the inclusion of
various observable control variables (which are only available in the
pre-2005 period—e.g., forward-looking citation counts). We also
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estimate a so-called “triple-differences” regression that explores
whether the differential maintenance-rate result is itself stronger
with respect to large entities within those high-maintenance-rate
categories (under an assumption that a benevolent PTO wishing to
minimize its distortionary practices as much as possible would focus
its distortionary efforts on the highest fee generators—i.e., largeentity patents within high-maintenance-rate classes). As explained in
further detail in Appendix A, this “triple-differences” specification
allows us to rule out the confounding influence of a larger range of
unobservable factors, including those that are specific to given
technology-year combinations and to given entity-size–year
combinations. Accordingly, this specification addresses concerns over
unobservable “shocks” in the grant rates of large entities and highmaintenance-rate categories in the post-1991 period. Indeed, as
demonstrated by Table A5 of Appendix B, we find evidence suggesting
that the divergent grant rates between high- and low-maintenancerate categories is itself more concentrated in large entities within
those categories than small entities, providing general support to the
findings presented in Table 2.
To complement these dynamic figures, in Figure 3, we plot the
time trend in the PTO’s sustainability score, overlayed with the trend
in the differential grant rates between large and small entities
(reporting the means of the coefficients displayed in Figure 2,
represented in fractions). As demonstrated by this figure, consistent
with the interaction results of Table 2, the degree to which the PTO
elects to grant patents at a relatively higher rate to large entities
(presumably to earn higher revenues) appears to be highly correlated
with a deterioration in the Agency’s financial position—represented by
a reduction in the PTO’s sustainability score—during the period of
time following the imposition of the fully user-fee-funded system
(while not shown, a similar correlation becomes apparent with the
differential grant rates across technologies with high and low
maintenance rates). This correlation is apparent over the long horizon
and even with respect to several of the short-term spikes and dips in
the sustainability score (e.g., 1994, 2005, 2006, and 2009). The graph
also evidences an apparent correlation between the distortionary
granting practices and a relaxation of the relevant fee-diversion
policies in the post-2003 period.
While not shown, we likewise calculate an alternative
sustainability score that uses the backlog of applications awaiting a
first office action by the Agency (using annual data received from the
PTO pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request), as opposed to
the total backlog of applications awaiting completion of examination.
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Arguably more correlated with the commencement of this upward
trend in the differential grant rates between large and small entities,
this alternative sustainability measure, though nearly identical to the
one presented in Figure 3, begain its downward decline in 1995, as
opposed to 1997.

Figure 3. Sustainability Score Time Trend
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As evidenced by Figures 1 and 2, the divergent responses to the
1991 reform emerge with a several-year lag following 1991. This lag
may be reasonable under an assumption that it takes the PTO some
time to adjust its granting practices under the new fee regime. More
likely, perhaps, this lag may be attributable to the fact that markers
indicative of financial sustainability are particularly strong during the
1992 to 1995 period, as demonstrated by Figure 3. The PTO may have
experienced a financial boost over this short time period considering
that it began to collect the substantial twelve-year maintenance fees
for the first time during these years.106 Ultimately, the results from
these dynamic exercises lend further support to Hypotheses 2 and 4.
106. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 29 (“In the fiscal year 1994, the PTO was just
beginning to receive the full effects of the third stage renewal.”). The PTO saw a substantial
jump in renewal-fee income in the fiscal year 1994. Compare id. at 59 (noting that 32% of patent
fee collections resulted from maintenance fees), with U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ANNUAL
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E. Robustness / Specification Checks
There is a potential concern that selection effects due to
changes in the filing behavior among small and large entities
following the 1991 fee reform may be responsible for the observed
differential trends in the PTO’s granting behavior. Two selection-effect
scenarios in particular could potentially explain the observed
differential trends in grant rates. First, large entities or patent
applicants in high-renewal groups may file relatively fewer patent
applications post-1991 than pre-1991. This response could implicate a
possible concern that a selected sample of higher-quality applications
remained, resulting in the PTO granting more patents with respect to
large entities and high-maintenance-rate categories. Because the 1991
reform that modified the funding structure at the Agency level also
carried a substantial increase in the fees charged to applicants, it is
possible that applicants responded to this increase by reducing their
filings107 (potentially to a higher degree among large entities and
among those in high-maintenance-rate categories, considering the
higher expected fees).
Second, small entities or patent applicants in low-renewal
groups may file relatively more patent applications after the 1991
reform than before. This response would also implicate a concern that
a selected sample of applications are driving our results; however, this
selected sample would be of lower, not higher, quality. Both the post1991 enactment of programs at the PTO to assist small entities108 and
the rise of the “patent troll” or the nonpracticing entity,109 could
possibly result in small entities increasing their filings. We appease
both of these concerns in Table A7 of Appendix B and demonstrate
that the 1991 reform did not lead to either a reduced (and possibly
more-selective) large-entity or high-renewal-rate applicant pool or an
increased (and possible less-selective) small-entity or low-renewal-rate
applicant pool in the post-1991 period. More specifically, if anything, it
appears that the 1991 reform is associated with an incrementally
REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1993, at 34 fig.9 (1994) (noting that 26% of patent fee collections resulted
from maintenance fees).
107. There is some support for a modest sensitivity of patent demand to fees. See generally
Gaetan de Rassenfosse & B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, On the Price Elasticity of Demand
for Patents, 74 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 58, 58–77 (2011).
108. For example, the PTO began hosting an annual Independent Inventor Conference in
1995. See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Fifth Annual Independent Inventors
Conference (Sept. 26, 2000), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2000/00-55.jsp.
109. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 630 (2008) (describing generally the rise of the patent troll).
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higher rate of filing for large entities relative to small entities and for
high-maintenance-rate technologies relative to low-maintenance-rate
technologies.110
A potential concern likewise arises that certain developments
in substantive patent law may be responsible for the observed
differential trends in the PTO’s granting behavior. For instance, this
may occur if the law expands what constitutes patentable subject
matter within technologies that happen to have high maintenance
rates or high concentrations of large-entity applicants. Patent scholars
have noted that patent-eligible technology has expanded largely to
include inventions in the field of biotechnology, software, and business
methods.111 However, most of the legal developments of this
potentially expansionary nature with respect to biotechnology
occurred in the early- to mid-1980’s prior to the estimation sample
frame.112 While the mid- to late-1990’s likewise experienced
expansions in patentable subject matter that likely targeted software
and business method patents,113 the above results are not a reflection
of these developments, as demonstrated by Table A2 in Appendix B.
The estimates remain virtually unchanged when we remove those
technology categories implicated by the relevant legal developments.
Another possible concern arises that the divergent grant rates
across the various patent types are a response to the passage of the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”)
agreement in 1995. Considering the variation in category-specific
examination times, one of the effects of TRIPS (which modified the
110. Furthermore, a decrease in sustainability score (and thus an increased need of funds) is
associated with an incrementally higher rate of filing for high-maintenance-rate technologies
relative to low-maintenance-rate technologies. Finally, there is no signifigant evidence to suggest
that a decrease in sustainability score is associated with an incrementally higher filing rate for
small relative to large entities, which could pose troubling selection concerns. See also infra
Appendix B (generally discussing the robustness of the above findings to the possibility of
compositional changes in applicants among the delineated patent types).
111. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 16, at 381 (describing the “dramatic expansion of the
scope of patentable subject matter”).
112. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980) (holding that “human-made,
genetically engineered bacterium” is patentable subject matter); see also Policy Statement on the
Patentability of Animals, 1077 Off. Gaz. Pat. & Trademark Office 24 (Apr. 21, 1987), reprinted in
DONALD S. CHISUM, 9 CHISUM ON PATENTS app. 24-1 (2005) (“[T]he Patent and Trademark Office
now considers nonnaturally occurring, nonhuman multicellular living organisms, including
animals, to be patentable subject matter.”).
113. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (enlarging patent subject matter to include anything that provides a “useful, concrete, and
tangible result”), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (2008); Proposed Examination
Guidelines for Computer-Implemented Inventions, 60 Fed. Reg. 28,778, 28,778 (proposed June 2,
1995).
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patent term from seventeen years from issuance to twenty years from
application) was to increase the effective patent length for some
technology categories relative to others.114 One might argue that
TRIPS induced those patents in the larger-expansion categories to file
higher-quality applications in the post-1995 period, resulting in a
higher grant rate. To the extent that such categories are correlated
with those that also maintain their patents at high rates or that have
strong large-entity representations, the possibility of this TRIPS story
may confound the above analysis. In Table A2 of Appendix B, we
address these concerns by demonstrating that the regression results
presented above are robust to the inclusion of control variables
capturing a differential response to being in the post-1991 period (or,
in the alternative, in the post-1995 period) across technology
categories with different examination prosecution times (i.e., with
different patent-duration increases expected under TRIPS).115
In Appendix B (primarily in Table A2), we further demonstrate
the robustness of the findings reported in Table 2 and in Figures 1–3
to an additional range of specification checks. These exercises largely
demonstrate the flexibility of the above results to the use of various
alternative approaches in either specifying the key analytical
variables or in specifying the empirical model itself. More specifically,
we discuss the robustness of the findings to:
 the inclusion of control variables capturing the intensity
of usage of requests for continued examinations (“RCE”)
and their predecessors (i.e., continuing prosecution
applications (“CPA”)), to alleviate concerns that some
patent types are better able to secure ultimate
allowances through greater usage of these mechanisms;
 the systematic, one-by-one exclusion of each technology
category from the regression specification (along with
the exclusion of each patent class and broad (six-level)
category) to demonstrate that no single technology
(broadly or narrowly defined) is driving the results;

114. David S. Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? An Analysis of Patent Duration and
Incentives to Innovate, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1613, 1615 (2009).
115. Likewise, we also estimate the main difference-in-difference specifications for two
different sets of patent categories: (1) within the top 25% of patent categories based on the
expected duration increase associated with TRIPS and (2) within the bottom 25% of patent
categories based on the expected TRIPS-related patent duration increase. We actually find a
stronger divergent response to the 1991 fee reform for patents within the latter set of patent
categories, suggesting that the overall findings are not likely driven by TRIPS as opposed to the
fee reform.
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alternative constructions of the PTO grant rate (and the
use of natural logs of all such rates);
the inclusion of various category-year-specific control
variables;
the simultaneous (as opposed to separate) treatment of
maintenance-rate, entity-size, and examination-cost
stories;
the specification of the 1991 reform variable as a
postreform linear-trend variable,116 along with the
subsequent inclusion of technology-category-specific
linear time trends;
the classification of technology categories based on (1)
the PTO Classification System and (2) the broad sixcategory classification scheme alternatively introduced
by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg;117
the estimation of a “triple-differences” empirical
specification that explores whether the divergence in
patent grant rates across high- and low-maintenancerate categories is itself stronger for large (relative to
small) entities within those categories;
the use of a more flexible randomization-inference
approach to the determination of the statistical
significance of the estimates;
the specification of the fee reform based on the
percentage of the Agency’s funding attributable to user
fees; and
less parametric specifications of those factors, such as
category-specific maintenance rates, that are treated
linearly in the main regressions.
F. Results Summary and Implications

Collectively, the above findings provide consistent and robust
evidence of:
 an association between the 1991 reform and a
divergence in granting patterns between patent
applications filed by large versus small entities;
 an association between the 1991 reform and a
divergence in granting patterns between patent
116. See Finkelstein & Acemoglu, supra note 91, at 855–56.
117. See supra note 84.
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applications associated with high- versus low-renewalrate categories;
 a stronger association of the above nature during times
when the PTO is more likely to be bound by financial
sustainability constraints; and
 a stronger association of the above nature during times
in which the PTO is subject to a less stringent feediversion policy.
As discussed above, our results have a number of implications
for both policy and theory.118 First, from a social welfare perspective
our results are discouraging. Under the assumption that the PTO’s
grant rates would otherwise reflect the optimal balance between
dynamic innovation-stimulation incentives and static consumer
welfare costs, any marginal increase in patent granting attributable
solely to the Agency’s funding structure may implicate potentially
substantial social welfare costs.119 From a policy perspective, our
results also suggest that the 50% reduction in patent fees to small
entities may have the inadvertent effect of biasing the PTO toward
granting patents associated with large enterprises. As a result, it is
possible that the PTO’s response to the fee differential may end up
leaving small entities worse off than before this special status was
created. On a theoretical level, our results are also relevant to the
ongoing debate in administrative law regarding the nature of
governmental employees. Our finding that the PTO’s granting
distortions are more likely to occur when markers indicative of an
underfunded PTO are present contradicts the idea that bureaucrats
are budget maximizers while lending support to the notion that when
agencies seek enlarged budgets they do so as a result of being mission
minded but resource constrained.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND REDUCING THE PTO’S FINANCIAL INCENTIVE TO
GRANT PATENTS
Beyond the implications already discussed, our results are also
relevant to the recently passed America Invents Act. This section
begins by exploring the implications of our findings to the America
Invents Act and then turns to sketch two possible mechanisms for
reducing PTO bias toward granting patents: eliminating the Agency’s

118. See supra Part I.
119. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
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self-financing requirement and changing the fee structure of the
Agency.
A. Implications of the America Invents Act
The results presented in this Article have implications for at
least two changes brought forth to the patent system by the America
Invents Act (“the Act”), which represents the most significant
modification to the patent system since 1952. Our findings cast doubt
on whether the provisions of the Act that create a new status of
microentity and provide this entity with reduced patent fees will fulfill
their legislative intent of nurturing innovation by individual
inventors,120 similar to doubts that have arisen as to whether
congressional action attempting to support small entities seeking
patents has achieved its desired result. Our results suggest that under
the historic fee schedule, the fee reduction provided to microentities
will likely have the undesirable effect of biasing the PTO toward
granting patents filed by large entities. Just as with small entities, it
is possible that the alleged benefits that microentities obtain by
paying reduced patent fees may be outweighed by the harms they
experience in the marketplace because the PTO is extending
preferential treatment toward large enterprises.
Second, our results should help to allay some of the concerns
voiced by those who opposed the sections of the Act that granted the
Agency’s fee-setting authority. Several groups objected to giving the
PTO the ability to set its fees out of fear that the Agency would act in
a self-interested and imperialistic manner—for example, dramatically
increasing its fees and decreasing its productivity.121 Our findings that
the PTO’s behavior is more consistent with the model of benevolence
than self-interestedness suggest that the PTO is more likely to
restructure its fees to recover its aggregate costs while continuing or

120. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10(g), 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 123 (2011)) (requiring micro entities to have not filed more than four
previously filed patent applications at the PTO and to have a gross income that does not exceed
three times the medium household income as reported by the Bureau of the Census); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 50 (2011) (describing Congress’s intent to spur innovation among
independent inventors).
121. See, e.g., Letter from Douglas Norman, President, Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass’n, to
John Conyers & Lamar Smith, U.S. Congressmen (May 17, 2010), available at
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&C
ONTENTID=25867 (“[W]e are concerned that placing fee-setting authority with the USPTO will
lead to large declines in productivity and large increases in fees in the longer term.”).
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expanding its current productivity than set its fees in a manner to
clandestinely maximize its budget.122
B. Reducing the PTO’s Financial Incentives to Grant Patents
Currently, our findings suggest that the inadequacies of the
examination fees and the existence of post-allowance fees may bias
even a benevolent PTO toward granting patents. Our results also
suggest that this bias is most likely to manifest with respect to patent
grants that the PTO stands the most to profit from—patents with a
high likelihood of being renewed and patents associated with large
entities. The PTO’s granting distortions could be eliminated by
removing the Agency’s ability to use post-allowance fees as a
mechanism to raise revenue. We explore two different approaches to
this end: funding the Agency, at least partially, from direct
appropriations and restructuring the PTO’s fee schedule.
The PTO’s financial incentive to grant patents may be
decreased and possibly eliminated by financing the Agency, at least
partially, from tax revenue. If the Agency’s funding does not scale
directly with its revenue collection, the PTO’s financial incentive to
grant patents could be substantially curtailed. Our findings that the
PTO’s granting bias is dampened during fee diversion support this
contention. However, we are concerned that Congress may fail to
adequately fund the Agency. Mounting concern regarding deficit
containment as well as Congress’s past track record of utilizing PTO
fees to fund other governmental activity (even when the Agency’s
financial sustainability was in question) suggest that serious
consideration should be given to eliminating the PTO’s granting bias
by restructuring the Agency’s fee schedule.
The PTO has very recently been given the ability to set its fees
to recoup its aggregate costs by rulemaking.123 As a result, modifying
the Agency’s fee schedule may be easier today than before the Agency
had such authority.124 Importantly, any fee schedule adopted must
take into account not only the PTO’s needs for financial sustainability
but also the incentives and social welfare of patent applicants and
society. More research is needed on how both the PTO and patent
122. See supra Section IV.B (suggesting that the PTO’s behavior reflects an attempt to
increase grant rates in an effort to raise additional revenue only when the Agency is financially
constrained not in an effort to maximize budget more generally).
123. America Invents Act § 10(a)(2).
124. At the time this Article was written the PTO had not proposed changes to its
examination, issuance, or renewal fees.
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applicants would respond to fee changes, and thus it is beyond the
scope of this Article to propose an optimal fee structure of the PTO. 125
Nonetheless, we believe it is helpful to begin to explore fee structures
that are likely to eliminate or dampen the PTO’s pro-patentee
tendencies identified in this Article.
To begin, the PTO cannot choose to eliminate the fee reductions
for small entities and microentities, as this is beyond the scope of its
rulemaking authority.126 Thus, one way to reduce the PTO’s incentives
toward granting patents to large entities may be to adopt a fee
schedule that curtails the Agency’s incentives toward allowing patents
in general.
The PTO could dampen its incentives to grant patents by
adopting a fee schedule that will align its examination fees with
examination costs and/or enacting other pre-allowance fees—i.e.,
restructuring its fee schedule so that it garners a greater percentage
of its budget through pre-allowance fees. Because the PTO is required
to set its fee collections to match its operational expenses, an increase
in the level of examination fees will likely necessitate a decrease in the
level of post-allowance fees. This fee schedule will likely reduce the
Agency’s tendency to grant patents, because the PTO will be less
likely to be constrained by financial sustainability—i.e., the Agency
will be less sensitive to dips in the nonbiased grant rate or aggregate
renewal fee collections. However, when the Agency’s sustainability is
triggered, the distortionary bias to grant patents will likely be larger.
The PTO will have to grant more patents to meet a revenue target
than it would have under its traditional fee structure because the
Agency stands to make less money per patent grant than it did under
the traditional fee schedule.
Additionally, as long as the Agency is dependent on back-end
fees, its pro-patentee tendencies will not be eliminated. The PTO will
still have to grant a certain percentage of patents in order for its fee
collections to match its operational expenses, and a number of factors
will continue to possibly disrupt the Agency’s financial equilibrium.127
125. Recent studies have shown that, at least with respect to low patent fees, patent
demand is relatively inelastic. See de Rassenfosse & van Pottelsberghe, supra note 106, at 71–72
(finding that the demand for patents is responsive to price, but relatively inelastic); Timothy K.
Wilson, Patent Demand – A Simple Path to Patent Reform, 2 INT’L IN-HOUSE COUNS. J. 806, 810–
12 (2008) (arguing that filing fees need to be raised significantly in order to reach the elastic
portion of the demand curve).
126. It also seems unlikely that Congress will extinguish these fee reductions, as the
America Invents Act just created the microentity status.
127. See supra Section I.B.2 (describing factors that may produce imbalance in the ratio of
post-allowance fees and operational expenses).
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Of course, the fact that the Agency has recently been granted feesetting authority means the PTO can attempt to reestablish financial
equilibrium by changing its fee structure, rather than granting
additional patents. However, there are several reasons why the
Agency may struggle with utilizing rulemaking to routinely tweak its
fee schedule.128 First, legislative challenges and procedural
requirements associated with rulemaking may increase the cost of the
process to such a level that the Agency will not be able to frequently
utilize the process to change its fee structure.129 Second, to the extent
the Agency is facing an impending financial crisis, the PTO may not
be able to enact fee increases fast enough to boost its revenue, as the
rulemaking process can take years to complete.130 Thus, a PTO that is
both dependent on back-end fees and facing immediate financial
pressures may still turn to granting additional patents in an effort to
augment its fee collections.
Perhaps the only way to eliminate a self-sufficient PTO’s bias
toward granting patents is to abolish post-allowance fees altogether.
Under this approach the Agency’s examination fees would need to be
dramatically increased, and possibly other pre-allowance fees would
need to be enacted in order for the PTO’s fee collections to cover its
128. It is likely, though, that the PTO will be able to use rulemaking to occasionally change
its fee structure.
129. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 617–20 (6th ed. 2009) (describing institutional impediments to
rulemaking). The PTO, like many other agencies, has struggled with using rulemaking to
implement changes. For example, in 2007 the PTO utilized rulemaking to limit the number of
continuation applications as well as the number of claims that could be included within each
application. However, the Agency ultimately rescinded the regulations amidst court challenges.
See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 328 Fed. App’x 658, 658 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (holding that both the claim and continuation rules were procedural in nature and
within the Agency’s rulemaking authority, but that the continuations rule was inconsistent with
patent law); Tafas v. Doll, 328 Fed. App’x 658, 658–59 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (granting petition to
rehear the case en banc, vacating the panel opinion); Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 817
(E.D. Va. 2008) (granting summary judgment against the PTO); Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d
652, 671 (E.D. Va. 2007) (granting a preliminary injunction preventing the PTO from
implementing changes to the continuation practice on the eve of their implementation); Changes
to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications Containing Patentably
Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug.
21, 2007) (codified at scattered sections of 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (revising patent rules regarding
continuing applications); Press Release, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Office, USPTO Rescinds
Controversial Patent Regulations Package Proposed by Previous Administration (Oct. 8, 2009),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/09_21.jsp (reporting on the PTO’s Final Rule rescinding
regulations, providing background on the rules, and reviewing related litigation history).
130. Several agencies have abandoned rulemaking altogether, largely in part due to
frustration with the slow pace at which the process proceeds. ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION
BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 16
(1982) (describing the Securities and Exchange Commission’s evolution toward adjudication).
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operational expenses. As the Agency’s entire fee stream would derive
from pre-allowance activity, the Agency would no longer have a
financial incentive to grant patents, because the Agency no longer
stands to gain any additional fee revenue from patent grants. While
this fee structure would eliminate the pro-patentee tendencies
identified in this Article, it is not clear that it would enhance
consumer welfare overall. The elimination of maintenance fees would
effectively mean that all patents would last their entire term of twenty
years, which may substantially increase the static costs of patents to
society. Furthermore, depending on how patent applicants would
respond to increased fees, patent applications may fall to a level below
ideal.131 The former concern could be addressed, however, by
preserving renewal fees but restricting the amount of renewal fees the
PTO can retain. The restricted fees could be utilized to pay a portion
or all of the small-entity and microentity subsidy. This funding
structure would likely result in dampening the Agency’s bias toward
issuing patents that are likely to be renewed or that were filed by
large entities. Most likely, Congress would need to enact additional
changes to the PTO’s funding structure in order to achieve this result,
but these changes would be minor.
CONCLUSION
This Article presents the first empirical study of the influence
of the PTO’s funding on the Agency’s decision on whether or not to
grant a patent. Our findings suggest that the PTO’s current fee
schedule likely biases the Agency to grant patents. Moreover, we find
the Agency’s bias is more likely to manifest with respect to patents
that it stands to profit the most from granting—patents that are likely
to be renewed or patents filed by large entities. Furthermore, we also
find that these distortions are more likely to occur when markers
indicative of an underfunded PTO are present.
In addition to their theoretical implications, our findings also
speak to policy issues concerning patent law. Prior to our study,
commentators failed to recognize the extent to which the PTO’s fee
schedule biased the Agency toward issuing patents. As a result, recent
131. See supra note 125 (citing sources that illustrate relative inelasticity of patent demand
at least with respect to low patent fees). A simple decrease in patent filings does not necessarily
have negative social welfare implications. Patent applicants may respond to the increased fees by
better sorting patent applications—i.e., filing applications that are more likely to meet the
standards of patentability. Companies and individuals may also utilize alternative mechanisms
to protect their ideas, such as trade secrecy.
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patent reform, which was enacted in part to address the harms
associated with the PTO issuing too many invalid patents, may not
eliminate the granting pressure identified in this Article. Moreover,
our results have a number of implications for the recently enacted
America Invents Act, including the creation of microentity status
wherein eligible patent applicants pay 75% reduced patent fees. Our
findings suggest that the fee reductions for microentities are likely to
have the unintended consequence of further biasing the PTO toward
granting patents to large entities.

